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This thesis juxtaposes the enabling attributes of tactical
aerial reconnaissance with the myopic force structure policy
which resulted in the demise of Marine aerial reconnaissance
on the eve of the Persian Gulf War. Commencing with the debut
of American photo reconnaissance aircraft in World War I, and
continuing through the present, the U.S. tactical aerial
reconnaissance capability problematic development cycle of
high emphasis during war and gross neglect during peacetime is
documented. For the United States Marine Corps, the impact of
this trend of dysfunctional command priorities during Desert
Shield/Desert Storm contingency operations in Southwest Asia
is elucidated and the misnomer of "intelligence failure" is
revealed. Based on analysis of these events and the recurring
intelligence requirements of combat, this thesis sets forth
the requirement for continuous maintenance of a viable
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Tactical aerial reconnaissance, airpower's oldest mission,
has been an effective force multiplier for the military forces
of many nations. However, development of this vital military
capability in the United States has been neither historically
consistent nor functionally oriented. Commencing with the
debut of photo reconnaissance aircraft in World War I, and
continuing through the present, the development of U.S. "tac
recce" has followed a problematic cycle of high emphasis
during war and gross neglect during peacetime. As a result,
U.S. forces have never arrived on the field of battle in
possession of a tac recce capability commensurate with their
mission requirements.
For the U.S. Marine Corps, this myopic trend reached its
nadir on August 10, 1990, when the Corps' only remaining tac
recce squadron was disbanded on the eve of the Persian Gulf
War. The dissolution of these assets was the product of
dysfunctional command priorities, which discounted the
enabling attributes of aerial reconnaissance, and consequently
reduced the fiscal and doctrinal support needed to maintain
such vital resources.
The emergence of new requirements to support precision
munitions delivery, responsive battle damage assessment,
obstacle breaching operations, and collateral damage
xi
limitation within the politically constrictive environment of
Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm resulted in a geometric
increase in Marine imagery tasking. But unfortunately, the
Marine Corps no longer had the organic capability to satisfy
such requirements.
Despite wide-ranging efforts to compensate, all available
options proved to be incapable of satisfying Marine imagery
requirements in Southwest Asia. Operational commanders quickly
acknowledged that only an organic tac recce capability, such
as that which recently had been forfeited, could ensure timely
and responsive intelligence support.
Following combat operations, many Marine commanders called
for the reestablishment of organic tac recce. However, by
later mislabeling the demise of Marine tac recce as an
"intelligence failure, " a counterproductive group of observers
tacitly diverted attention from the systemic deficiencies of
command emphasis which are clearly responsible for blinding
"The Eyes of the Corps." Thus, potential exists to revert to
the same fiscal and doctrinal neglect which has shackled
development of tactical aerial reconnaissance for most of this
century
.
As a paradigm, the Persian Gulf War indicates that future
conflicts will conceivably be even more demanding of a viable
aerial reconnaissance capability. Coalition warfare in the
emerging world order will emphasize the careful application of
xii
force within a framework of close political oversight. While
recent experience clearly showed that tac recce can excel in
such environment, it also reaffirmed that those assets will
continue to be most responsive to their owners.
Previous wars have extended the luxury of time to
reconstitute languid capabilities, but future conflicts more
likely will require U.S. Marine Corps readiness to fight upon
arrival. In this context, continuous availability of a viable
tac recce capability is essential to combat effectiveness.
The current era of political scrutiny and fiscal austerity
demands that planners carefully preserve vital capabilities in
the U.S. military force structure, and avoid mispriorit ization
pitfalls which threaten readiness.
To this end, the Corps must escape the myopic trend which
recently precluded the availability of an organic tac recce
capability during crisis and combat. Recognition of previous
dysfunctional command priorities, and abandonment of the
misleading "intelligence failure" label are central to the
resolution of this problem.
Although the planned Marine tac recce capability promises
to provide timely and responsive support, previous myopic
force structure policies still preclude the availability of
this capability until 1995; the legacy of the past thus
lingers. To prevent resurgence of this phenomenon in the long
term, it would be prudent for the Marine Corps to place
xiii
greater command emphasis and program support on tactical
aerial reconnaissance and similar force enabling capabilities.
xiv
I . INTRODUCTION
"Reconnaissance can never be superseded; knowledge comes
before power, and the air is first of all a place to see
from. "
Sir Walter Raleigh
(Brookes, 1975, p. 9)
Tactical aerial reconnaissance is the employment of manned
aircraft to collect current information on enemy activity,
installations, and terrain within the immediate area of
operations; it is airpower's oldest mission, having been
employed by France as early as 1794. Throughout the history of
modern warfare, tactical aerial reconnaissance has proven to
be an effective force multiplier on the battlefield. {Air
reconnaissance, 1979, p. 3)
Although aerial reconnaissance, evolving from primitive
observation balloons to supersonic multisensor aircraft, has
played a vital role in combat for many nations' military
forces, its development as a military capability in the United
States has been neither historically consistent nor
functionally oriented. Commencing with the debut of photo
reconnaissance aircraft in World War I, and continuing through
the present, this vital capability has followed a problematic
cycle of high emphasis during war and gross neglect during
peacetime. Despite a continual increase in the requirement for
aerial reconnaissance among operational commanders throughout
post-World War I military history, the U.S. military services
have never arrived on the field of battle in possession of an
aerial reconnaissance capability commensurate with their
mission .
For the United States Marine Corps, this myopic trend
reached its nadir on August 10, 1990, when the Corps' only
remaining tactical reconnaissance squadron was disbanded, and
"The Eyes of the Corps" were functionally blinded, immediately
prior to the commencement of contingency operations in
Southwest Asia.
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm revealed an
unprecedented demand for imagery intelligence among Marine
commanders. The emergence of new requirements to support
precision munitions delivery, responsive battle damage
assessment, obstacle breaching operations, and collateral
damage limitation within a politically constrictive
environment resulted in a geometric increase of imagery
requirements. But the Marine Corps had no organic capability
to satisfy the imagery intelligence requirements of its
operational commanders.
Initially, the Marine Corps examined the feasibility of
reactivating the Marine Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron to
support operations in Southwest Asia. However, when prevailing
fiscal and temporal constraints forced abandonment of this




All available options, including remotely piloted
vehicles, joint service capabilities, and national systems
proved to be incapable of satisfying Marine requirements
during crisis and combat operations. Only an organic tactical
aerial reconnaissance capability could have provided the
timely and responsive support sought by Marine commanders.
Thus, the Marine Corps was somewhat harshly reacquainted with
the enabling attribute of tactical aerial reconnaissance; the
lack of such a capability seriously jeopardized planning for
effective, but judicious application of combat power during
operations in Southwest Asia. ]
Immediately following Operation Desert Storm, there was an
explicit demand for immediate reconstitution of the Marine
Corps' organic tactical aerial reconnaissance capability,
based upon that recent experience. However, as it does all too
frequently, time has dampened the fervor with which this end
is being pursued.
Although the planned future Marine aerial reconnaissance
capability will surely provide timely and responsive support,
it will not be operational until 1995. Tacit acceptance of a
three-year capability gap subsequent to the elucidative
aNote that the Marine Corps' effectiveness despite this
significant capability void can largely be attributed to the
six-month preparatory period and the extensive 39-day air
campaign which preceded ground combat operations in Southwest
Asia .
experience of combat in Southwest Asia constitutes an
imprudent extension of the very trend which deprived the
Marine Corps of aerial reconnaissance during planning
throughout Operation Desert Shield and indeed during combat
throughout Operation Desert Storm.
As a paradigm, the Persian Gulf War indicates that future
conflicts will conceivably be even more demanding of a viable
aerial reconnaissance capability. Coalition warfare in the
emerging world order will emphasize the careful application of
force within a framework of close political oversight. Issues
including non-provocative reconnaissance for escalation
control, precision targeting for damage limitation, rapid and
accurate satisfaction of battle damage assessment
requirements, and post-war monitoring for ceasefire and/or
treaty verification will dominate the intelligence collection
effort. It is precisely in such an environment that tactical
aerial reconnaissance excels. However, it is also reasonable
to expect that aerial reconnaissance assets will continue to
be most responsive to their owners.
In the past, major conflicts have generally been of
sufficient duration to allow reconstitution of the U.S. aerial
reconnaissance capability through accelerated research and
development programs directed toward satisfying the immediate
needs of the war. However, recent experience suggests that
although future conflicts will levy a dramatically more taxing
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demand for aerial reconnaissance, they likely will not provide
the luxury of time to reconstitute a demobilized capability;
U.S. forces may be required to fight upon arrival in the
theater of operations. 2 Thus, in order to ensure maximum
effectiveness in future conflicts, the U.S. Marine Corps must
escape the myopic trend which recently precluded the
availability of a vital organic intelligence capability during
crisis and combat.
To elude this trend, the Corps must acknowledge that the
Marine tactical aerial reconnaissance debacle was not an issue
of intelligence failure; rather it was a manifestation of a
systemic dysfunction in command priorities.
The purpose of this thesis is to juxtapose the enabling
attributes of tactical aerial reconnaissance with the myopic
force structure policy which resulted in the demise of Marine
aerial reconnaissance on the eve of the Persian Gulf War.
Chapter II reviews the historical development of aerial
reconnaissance, from its inception as a military capability
through the post-Vietnam period. Chapter III examines the
emasculation of the Marine Corps Imagery Intelligence
Architecture through the untimely dissolution of Marine
2Note that Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm,
despite the anomaly of wide-spread political and fiscal
support from both domestic and international sources, and
notwithstanding a six month preparatory period prior to ground
operations, did not result in a reconstituted Marine tactical
aerial reconnaissance capability.
tactical aerial reconnaissance assets. Chapter IV discusses
Marine imagery intelligence shortfalls experienced during
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Chapter V presents
the significance of aerial reconnaissance in the context of
national system and remotely piloted vehicle capabilities. The
final chapter promulgates the requirement for the Marine Corps
to consistently maintain a viable tactical aerial
reconnaissance capability.
It is paramount that the Marine tactical aerial
reconnaissance--as well as the aggregate intelligence
capability--receive peacetime command emphasis which is
commensurate with its wartime impact. Neglect of these
enabling capabilities constitutes a failure in command, and
jeopardizes the effectiveness of Marines in combat.
II. AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. THE EVOLUTION OF AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE
"I have spent all of my life in trying to guess what
lay on the other side of the hill. "
The Duke of Wellington
(Rodgers, 1983, p. 157)
Military commanders have sought the capability to "see over
the next hill" since the advent of armed conflict among men.
On the earliest battlefields, commanders in control of the
highest terrain were able to more effectively monitor enemy
activity with their own eyes, and thus plan friendly
operations accordingly. The invention of the telescope and
similar optical devices in the sixteenth century greatly
extended the ranges at which the commander could track enemy
movements. However, as the scope of warfare and the size of
the battlefield increased, information regarding enemy
activities beyond the range of the aided eye became
increasingly more vital, as well as more elusive. In the
military profession, such knowledge became known as
"intelligence," while efforts to acquire such knowledge were
termed "reconnaissance." (Heiman, 1972, p. IX)
In efforts to surmount the limitations presented by
distance and terrain, nations have sent military observers
aloft on reconnaissance missions, in a variety of
contraptions, for centuries. (Burrows, 1986, p. 28)
Chinese and Japanese folklore mention the use of
spotters who either went up in baskets suspended from
giant kites or else were strapped right onto them. France
is credited with being the first western nation to use
aerial reconnaissance. It organized a company of
"aerostiers" in April 1794, during the revolutionary wars,
and is said to have kept one balloon aloft for nine hours
while the group's daring commander, Colonel Jean Marie
Joseph Coutelle, made continuous observations during the
battle of Fleuries in Belgium. 3 (Burrows, 1986, p. 28)
In fact, the French victory at Fleuries was largely
attributed to Colonel Coutelle' s observations of enemy
activity. (U.S. Marine Corps FMFM 5-10, 1990, p. 1-1) The
French quickly became strong advocates of aerial
reconnaissance; "Napoleon used a company of aerostiers in the
siege of Mantua in 1797, and the following year took a balloon
corps on his expedition to Egypt." (Burrows, 1986, p. 28)
Napoleon was noted for his tactic of exploiting the weakest
sector in his opponent's front at a decisive moment, through
the effective application of the Jominian military principles
of mass and concentration of effort. The balloon offered
Napoleon a means by which he could accurately ascertain the
3Over a year before this first military employment of
aerial reconnaissance, the French aeronaut Blanchard made a
balloon ascent before a large crowd in Philadelphia to
introduce flight to the Americans. General George Washington
was among the observers at this event on 9 January 1793. (see
Heiman, p. 7 for discussion)
disposition of enemy forces and subsequently exercise optimal
control over his artillery and infantry. (Heiman, 1972, p. 8)
Although the observation balloon significantly extended the
range at which the military commander could collect
intelligence, there were three distinct disadvantages inherent
to this method. First, the observer might not fully appreciate
the tactical implications of all observed activity. Second,
the observer's report was highly subjective. Finally, aside
from the terse notes dropped to the ground, the observer could
not provide detailed information until he landed. Because the
observer's memory and personal interpretation provided the
only available record of these reconnaissance missions, it is
reasonable to expect that pertinent details easily could have
been lost. (Stanley, 1981, p. 19)
In the year following Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo, French
scientist Joseph Nicephore Niepce began experimenting with
lithographic processes, and by 1822, he successfully produced
what is considered to be the first permanent photograph in his
laboratory. Later, in 1829, Niepce formed a partnership with
French painter L.J.M. Daguerre, an inventor who had conducted
extensive experiments with the photosensitive properties of
silver salts. After Niepce' s death in 1833, Daguerre continued
to conduct research in the chemical photographic process, and
finally, in 1838, succeeded in permanently capturing the image
of the "camera obscura" 4 on a chemically treated copper
plate through his newly developed silver-based technique.
This first practical photographic process was aptly named the
"Daguerreotype." (Heimann, 1972, pp. 8-10)
While visiting France in 1839, American inventor Dr. Samuel
F.B. Morse was fascinated by the Daguerreotype. "Morse brought
the news of the invention back to the United States, where
photographs became popularly known as "tintypes." 5 Within a
few years, a flourishing photographic industry was established
in America, on a magnitude which eclipsed that of Europe.
(Heiman, 1972, p. 11)
The economic potential of the photography business
stimulated continued research and development in both the
United States and Europe. Eventually, a photographic technique
known as the "wet collidion process," developed by British
architect Scott Archer in 1851, significantly expanded the
potential applications of photography by reducing the required
exposure time from four thousand seconds (for the
Daguerreotype) to eight seconds. (Heimann, 1972, p. 12)
4Literally translated from Latin, "camera obscura" means
"dark chamber;" the word "camera," as applied to contemporary
photographic equipment, is derived from this early
terminology
.
5The term "tintype" refers to the metal sheet, which
constituted the focal plane for early photographs.
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The invention and subsequent improvement of the camera and
related photographic technology clearly offered a new range of
possibilities, as well as a higher grade of effectiveness for
aerial reconnaissance "because it promised to provide
tacticians on the ground with detailed photographs they could
study, rather than with impressionistic sketches or oral
descriptions of what was happening beyond their line of
sight." (Burrows, 1986, p. 29)
Notwithstanding the apparent military advantages afforded
by the advent of aerial flight and photography, the two infant
technologies were not married until 1856, when French
balloonist Gaspard Felix Tournachon photographed Paris from
the air. b The first American aerial photograph was credited
to Samuel A. King and James W. Blackwere, after they
successfully captured a picture of South Boston from the
basket of the balloon "Queen of the Air, " twelve hundred feet
above ground level (AGL) . (Burrows, 1986, p. 29)
During the U.S. Civil War, Union Army reports not only
recorded significant use of balloons for visual aerial
reconnaissance, but also documented the first military
application of aerial photography:
"Tournachon photographed Paris using an improved




Photographers succeeded in capturing on a single photo
plate all of the countryside between Richmond and
Manchester to the west and the Chickahominy river to the
east. Photo prints were made from the negative and a map
grid was superimposed on the photos . The observer in the
balloon was then able to give the commanders on the
ground, who had a duplicate photo, immediate information
of enemy activity and to pinpoint targets by grid
coordinates. (Heiman, 1972, p. 17)
Yet, despite such encouraging results, the employment of
aerial reconnaissance during the American Civil War was, at
best, limited, due to a number of reasons.
Balloon baskets were relatively small and the cameras
of the day were large and bulky. Furthermore, they used
(photographic) plates that had to be coated with a light-
sensitive emulsion in the field and then quickly used. In
addition, the photographs had to be developed soon after
being taken or their image would fade. Since it was
impractical to repeatedly send up and then pull down the
large balloons, there was little aerial photography of
battlefields during the war. (Burrows, 1986, p. 29)
Nevertheless, after the Civil War, serious experiments with
aerial photography continued, and were well under way by the
turn of the century. In addition to balloons, kites and even
pigeons 7 were considered as platforms for aerial cameras.
Concurrently, the development of photographic processing
techniques and camera equipment proceeded with fervor and
yielded such developments as the Kodak No. 1 Box Camera and
7The "pigeon camera, " patented by Julius Neubronner, was
a 2.5 ounce timer-activated device which was designed to be
carried by homing pigeons. Although the technique was a well-
received novelty at expositions, "pigeon reconnaissance"
proved to be impractical for military applications.
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paper roll film. 8 (Heiman, 1972, p. 24) However, at Kitty Hawk,
North Carolina on 17 December 1903, the Wright brothers
achieved a milestone which would not only revolutionize the
science of aerial reconnaissance, but would also unalterably
transform both the military and civilian worlds.
Following the maiden flight of the Wright brothers'
heavier-than-air craft,
military establishments in the United States and in Europe
were quick to understand that airplanes added two
incalculably important dimensions to aerial
reconnaissance: speed and range. Airplanes, which did not
have to be held captive by restraining ropes (like
balloons), could go virtually anywhere in search of
information and then get back speedily. This was seen for
what it was almost from the beginning: a military weapon
of staggering value. It took time for airplanes to be
produced and distributed, but once that had been done,
their adaptation to reconnaissance was swift and
apparently unquestioned. (Burrows, 1986, p. 31)
The first recorded photograph taken from a heavier-than-air
vehicle was taken by cameraman L.P. Bonvillain, who
accompanied Wilbur Wright on a demonstration flight near Le
Mans, France in 1908. (Brookes, 1975, p. 13)
By January 1911, the first American photograph from an
airplane was attributed to an anonymous passenger on a Curtiss
Hydroplane flying above the San Diego waterfront. When the
8The Kodak No. 1 Box Camera and paper roll film were
invented by George Eastman in 1883 and 1888, respectively. The
No. 1 camera offered the advantage of a lightweight, compact
system, while roll film facilitated the collection of a
continuous strip of photography.
13
U.S. Army Signal Corps established a flight training school at
College Park, Maryland, later in the same year, aerial
photography instruction was included in the curriculum.
(Stanley, 1981, p. 21)
The airplane's debut in combat also occurred in 1911, when
Italy went to war with Turkey over the control of Libya. On 23
October 1911, Captain Carlo Piazza, commander of the Italian
air flotilla in Libya, flew a visual reconnaissance mission
over Turkish positions in his Bleriot aircraft. Having been
convinced of the military significance of aerial
reconnaissance, on 23 February 1912, Captain Piazza mounted a
borrowed camera below his aircraft and continued his
reconnaissance missions with the advantages afforded by
photography. (Brookes, 1975, p. 13)
The results were so impressive that another pilot,
Captain Ricardo Moizo, also borrowed a camera and fitted
it to his aeroplane (sic) . The sum total of these
officers' efforts during the campaign did not amount to
much in terms of numbers of prints, but they did point the
way to the future. Inaccuracies on maps were highlighted
by reference to their photographs, and they were able to
do some survey work from the air in addition to accurate
troop and battery spotting. The Italian-Turkish war was a
limited beginning, but it showed - to those who were
willing to look - that aerial photography had great
potential. (Brookes, 1975, p. 13)
Britain and France, already embroiled in the conflict
sweeping across Europe, were more than willing to look at
aerial photography as a prospective force multiplier.
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B. WORLD WAR I: AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE COMES OF AGE
"Elevatis Nihil Celatur - To Those High Up, Nothing is
Concealed.
"
British 681 Reconnaissance Squadron Motto
(Brookes, 1975, p. 203)
"If the camera and airplane were the mother and father of
photo reconnaissance, then World War I was its midwife."
(Burrows, 1986, p. 32) As the sluggish war of attrition took
shape in the Autumn of 1914, commanders became increasingly
concerned with monitoring enemy activity beyond the stagnant
front lines, to gain knowledge of any preparations which
threatened to break the deadlock. The airplane promised to
fulfill the paramount need for reconnaissance, because it not
only provided a means of seeing over the next hill, but could
see over as many hills as necessary, unimpeded by trenches and
obstacles. (Heiman, 1972, p. 40)
Accordingly, reconnaissance airplanes began to appear over
the battlefield in increasing numbers. 9 With the proliferation
of aircraft, the rapid rise in reconnaissance missions, and
the inevitable juxtaposition of photographic and visual
reconnaissance capabilities, the limitations of aerial
9The significance ascribed to aerial reconnaissance
during the First World War is underscored by Sir Walter
Raleigh's statement that "the single use in war for which the
machines of the Military Wing of the Royal Flying Corps were
designed and the men trained was reconnaissance." (see
Brookes, p. 16 for discussion)
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observers, as previously experienced in the era of the
balloon, again became apparent, but in a more pronounced
way
.
The camera clearly offered an optimal solution to the
problems presented by the use of observers on aerial
reconnaissance missions. As an objective, mechanical device,
the camera was not constrained by the factors of human
judgement and fatigue; it recorded everything within its field
of view, and was much more sensitive than the human eye; and
it provided a detailed record of its observations, which could
be efficiently and effectively reproduced for mass
consumption. Furthermore, since the aerial photographer
required significantly less training than the aerial observer,
photographic reconnaissance aircrew could be replaced at a
relatively higher rate.
Therefore, as reconnaissance sorties became longer,
involving deeper penetrations into enemy airspace at
increasingly higher altitudes, and as cameras became more
luBrookes notes that "observers could only absorb, or
concentrate on, a limited amount of data at 70 MPH (the
average speed of the reconnaissance aircraf t ) . . . even if an
observer thought he saw what he was looking for among the
wealth of information that was visible beneath him, he might
be mistaken - the most skilled eye could confuse stretches of
tar on a road for troops on the move, or shadows cast by
gravestones as a bivouac site. It was also impossible for the
human brain to absorb everything of interest on a two-hour
flight - a man looking for troop movements might miss fresh
excavations or aircraft concentrations." (p. 17)
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dependable, far greater reliance was placed on photographic
evidence to reveal the enemy's plans and preparations.
As early as March 1915, "a trench map prepared chiefly from
aerial photographs was used with great success by (the
British) in the attack at Neuve Chappelle, and from there on
there was a continual urgent demand for photographic




However, "despite its operational trials of aerial
reconnaissance, by 1916 the United States had made pitifully
few advances, compared to the European combatants," (Stanley,
1981, p. 21) so that when America declared war on the Central
Powers in 1917, the U.S. Army could not claim a viable aerial
nBabington-Smith also notes initial resistance to aerial
photography: "At the start of the war some of the Army
diehards had felt it was unsporting (emphasis added) to
photograph the German rear positions, but these scruples were
soon forgotten." (p. 4) On the same issue, Brookes states "some
conservative elements went so far as to say that the
reconnaissance aircraft was an unethical intrusion into the
gentlemanly pursuit of war - it was not quite cricket
(emphasis added) to spy into an enemy's back yard and
photograph him with his trousers down." (p. 21) It is indeed
fortunate for the Allies that such moral inhibitions were cast
aside early in the war.
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photographic capability. Thus, in the United States, "a mad
scramble took place to organize aerial photographic units." 12
(Heiman, 1972, p. 50)
By the close of 1917, the German aerial reconnaissance
effort yielded an average of four thousand photographs each
day, and covered the entire Western Front every two weeks. 13
During March of 1918, Germany dedicated 505 of a total of
2,047 aircraft on the Western Front to reconnaissance
missions. (Burrows, 1986, pp. 33-34)
Combined British and French photographic reconnaissance
missions roughly equaled those of the Germans until mid-1918.
However, by Autumn 1918, the Allied reconnaissance effort had
assumed prodigious proportions.
During the Meuse-Argonne offensive that
September ... fifty-six thousand aerial reconnaissance
prints were delivered to various U.S. Army units within a
four-day period. The total number of prints provided
between 1 July, 1918 and Armistice Day the following
November came to 1.3 million. (Burrows, 1986, p. 36)
^Heiman also notes that "as so often has been the case,
the Americans have always had to 'catch-up' when thrust into
a war and literally build a war machine from scratch. This was
especially true in World War I." (p. 48)
130n 1 January 1918, in preparation for his last great
offensive, Ludendorff wrote that "complete photographic
reconnaissance (his emphasis) with no gaps must be ensured.
This is of decisive importance." In his manual on "The Attack
on Position Warfare, " Ludendorff stated that the needs of
aerial photography were to be paramount when new aircraft
reached the front; he placed fighters at the bottom of the
list, (see Brookes, p. 33 for discussion)
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By the close of the war, Lieutenant Edward Steichen,
Of f icer-in-Charge of the American Expeditionary Force Photo
Section, stated "the consensus of expert opinion, as expressed
at the various inter-Allied conferences, is that at least two-
thirds of all military information (was) either obtained or
verified by aerial photography ." (Brookes, 1975, p. 16)
It is estimated that by the end of World War I, at least
twenty-five percent of all the aircraft involved had been
employed as aerial photography platforms (Burrows, 1986,
p. 36), and by 11 November 1918, "virtually every major
application of photographic reconnaissance that was to be
employed over the next 50 years had been tried and tested."
(Brookes, 1975, p. 34)
It is significant to note that the development of aerial
photographic equipment generally kept pace with the
development of the airplane during the First World War.
Technological advances yielded increased operating altitudes
and velocities for aircraft, as well as corresponding
improvements in focal length and shutter speed for aerial
cameras . 14
14Focal length determines the range and/or altitude at
which targets can be photographed by a particular camera,
while camera shutter speed determines the speed at which an
aerial photography platform can travel and still collect a
usable (not blurred) image.
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Thus, the First World War had clearly been a watershed
event in the evolution of aerial photography as the paragon of
tactical reconnaissance. However, in the wake of The Great War
aerial reconnaissance was surprisingly accorded a
significantly reduced priority in the military.
1 . The Interwar Years : A Trend Emerges
"Now, here, you see, it takes all the running you can
do, to keep in the same place.
"
Lewis Carroll in Alice's Adventures in Wonderland
The value of aerial reconnaissance having been
established in World War I, low-keyed research, much of it
significant, continued throughout the twenties and
thirties despite shrunken military budgets and a
concomitant competition for funding among all commands
within the military services. Where the Army was
concerned, the Air Corps. . .was far back in line behind the
other fighting commands, and even behind the Corps of
Engineers, in competing for precious dollars. Even within
the Air Corps itself, pursuit and bomber wings, and the
research that went into them, had priority over
reconnaissance. And there was another wrinkle. Since top
commands in air forces throughout the world traditionally
went to pursuit and bomber pilots, just the way most
ground army generals and navy admirals came from the
infantry, cavalry, artillery, and the dreadnought
flotillas, respectively, there were no delusions among
career-minded junior officers the in Army Air Corps that
specializing in reconnaissance - in picture-taking and
interpretation - would put stars on their shoulders.
(Burrows, 1986, p. 36)
During the vast demobilization which followed the war,
aerial reconnaissance was relegated to a status of virtual
insignificance. In fact, in the U.S. Army Air Corps,
"development of such equipment as fire extinguishers and
parachutes took priority over aerial photography." (Heiman,
1972, p. 55)
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Even in the British Royal Air Force (RAF) , where aerial
photography had been extensively developed and employed during
the war, aerial reconnaissance specialists began to disappear
as multi -miss ion squadrons were promoted to minimize the
fiscal signature of the service.
As a result, during the inter-war years "no one became
particularly proficient in the art (of aerial photography) or
bothered much about its application. . .everyone regarded aerial
reconnaissance as a minor adjunct to their duties." (Brookes,
1975, p. 55)
Winston Churchill referred to the inter-war period as the
"locust years"- an era during which pacifism and retrenchment
had taken their toll on the recently developed and hard bought
military capabilities of the Allies. While it is reasonable to
expect that a significant demobilization will follow a major
war, it is likewise logical to presume that critical military
capabilities will be preserved on a proportional, albeit
smaller, scale in the post-war force. Yet, notwithstanding the
high level of emphasis placed on aerial reconnaissance during
the war, this vital capability was blatantly neglected
throughout the demobilization period which followed the First
World War.
Thus, just as the military value of aerial reconnaissance
was unquestionably established during World War I, so was an
unfortunate policy which discounted its significance during
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the post-war period. In the United States, the relative
priority accorded to aerial photography among military
capabilities during the war would never be restored in the
post-war force. This precedent set in motion a myopic trend
from which the American Armed Forces would never escape.
Had it not been for a handful of zealots who rejected the
emerging careerist tendencies in the U.S. military officer
corps, the American aerial reconnaissance capability would
have fallen into complete obscurity during the inter-war
years. 1 " Foremost among these pioneers was George W. Goddard,
a U.S. Army Air Corps officer who had served as an instructor
at the Army Aerial Photography School in 1917.
Subsequent to the war, Goddard conceived, tested, and
implemented a variety of new aerial reconnaissance techniques:
he experimented with both infrared and long-range photography;
he formalized the U.S. Army's first Aerial Photographic
Mapping Unit; he perfected night aerial photography
procedures; and he successfully transmitted photographs over
telegraph wires. (Burrows, 1986, p. 37)
Goddard' s most significant accomplishment was his
development of the stereoscopic twin-lens strip camera.
lsHeiman agrees that "in the United States, only the
persistence of a small group of officers and civilian
scientists enabled the Air Corps to develop cameras and
equipment suitable for photo reconnaissance, (p. 28)
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Previously, tactical reconnaissance aircraft had exclusively
relied upon high-speed oblique-mounted camera systems which
tended to yield blurred images when employed on low-altitude,
high-speed missions, due to the inability of the camera
shutter to operate at a speed commensurate with the ground
speed of a low-flying aircraft. Camouflaged gun emplacements
and similar targets proved to be invulnerable to the oblique
camera, since the mission profile required to ensure target
coverage 16 was beyond the technical capability of the
available camera system. In 1939, Goddard invented a shutter-
less camera which effectively matched film speed with aircraft
ground speed through the use of an electronic synchronizing
mechanism; the system also collected stereoscopic coverage
through the use of two lenses. (Burrows, 1986, p. 38 and
Heiman, 1972, p. 74)
While Goddard focused on surmounting the mechanical
limitations of aerial cameras, American filmmakers - primarily
Eastman Kodak - were developing improved aerial films.
Significant progress was made in increasing the light
sensitivity and reducing the diameter of the silver grains
integral to the film emulsion. Ultimately, improved films,
combined with more capable cameras, ostensibly promised to
16In this case, the mission profile would necessarily be
low-altitude to defeat the effectiveness of camouflage and
high-speed to defeat the effectiveness of the weapon crew.
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increase the resolution 17 and hence, the intelligence value
of aerial photographs. (Burrows, 1986, p. 39)
However, despite the dedicated efforts of George Goddard,
Eastman-Kodak, and other inclined parties, the American aerial
reconnaissance capability was at a much lower state of
readiness than that of the aggregate U.S. military on the eve
of World War II. The U.S. Navy had no recognizable aerial
photographic reconnaissance capability (Stanley, 1981, p. 100);
maritime scout aircraft, as well as longer range aircraft 18
were employed for visual observation, and not photography
missions. (Burrows, 1986, p. 47)
The Army was using three different kinds of flying
units to gather information .. .none of them suited to the
sort of photoreconnaissance that was suddenly required in
a war whose fronts changed rapidly. There were observation
units attached to ground forces that used light planes for
close support, artillery spotting, and other missions that
depended on visual sighting and a high degree of ground-
air coordination. There was photo-mapping, which for the
most part used commercial airliners that were wholly
inadequate for combat. Finally, there were squadrons that
were technically dedicated to reconnaissance, but these
were really bomber units whose planes carried cameras in
addition to guns and bombs. Training emphasized bombing
and self -protection, while photography, largely for bomb
damage assessment, was secondary. (Burrows, 1986, p. 48)
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"Resolution" refers to the minimum separation distance
between two objects on the ground at which an aerial
reconnaissance system can discriminate the objects from one
another
.
18The major long-range aircraft in the U.S. Navy inventory
at the outset of World War II were the PBY Catalina and the
PB2Y Coronado; neither had been specifically configured to
conduct aerial photography missions.
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The U.S military services simply lacked the physical means
prerequisite to the establishment of a credible aerial
reconnaissance capability. The science of photo
interpretation, the methods by which analysts extract
information of intelligence value from aerial photographs, was
also underdeveloped in the United States. On a conceptual
level, a significant lack of foresight, coupled with a
stubborn resistance to change, also constrained the
development of aerial photography within the American armed
forces. "As late as 1940 the (Army) General Staff was still
emphasizing the training of aerial observers, whose main
function would be to direct artillery fire as they had in
World War I," (Heiman, 1972, p. 89) despite the overwhelming
requirement for a photo reconnaissance capability and the
well-documented limitations of observers as intelligence
collectors
.
Thus, between the end of World War I and the start of
World War II, the concepts, skills, and equipment associated
with aerial photography were not accorded a high priority in
the United States, perhaps because the inter-war period "was
a time when men tried to forget the miseries of The Great War,
and succeeded only in forgetting the lessons they had learned
from it." (Brookes, 1975, p. 35) Although the development of
the airplane and its associated weapon systems proceeded with
vigor after World War I, the development of reconnaissance
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systems failed to keep pace. From then on, the U.S. armed
forces followed a clearly discernible pattern with regard to
aerial photography: immediately prior to and during war, heavy
emphasis would be reactively placed on the development of
aerial reconnaissance capabilities; but commencing with the
post-war demobilization and continuing through the subsequent
period of peace, disproportionately low emphasis (relative to
wartime experience) was placed on the development of
reconnaissance capabilities, and consequently, reconnaissance
systems were not concomitantly improved as aircraft
capabilities evolved.
Accordingly, as the Second World War developed and assumed
increasingly ominous proportions, American military commanders
became progressively more interested in acquiring photo
reconnaissance and photo interpretation capabilities; the
development of both was necessarily on a "crash" basis in the
early years of the war. (Heiman, 1972, p. 78)
C. WORLD WAR II: DEMAND INCREASES
"The military organization that has the best
photographic intelligence will win the next war"
Generaloberst Werner Frieherr Von Fritsch
(Brookes, 1975, p. 35)
France and Britain had successfully avoided the pitfalls
which plagued the deficient American aerial reconnaissance
capability. The French had organized tactically-oriented photo
reconnaissance units well before the start of the war:
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The French made maximum use of photography after the
Germans reoccupied the Rhineland in 1936. When the Germans
began constructing the Siegfried Line, the French Air
Force methodically photographed the process on a regular
basis. The French. . .were able to prepare detailed plans
(of the fortifications) because they saw the foundations
laid, the walls go up, and the roofs installed. (Heiman,
1972, p. 79)
During the first six months of the war, the French had
successfully photographed 6,000 square miles of enemy
territory
.
Likewise, the RAF had established a viable capability and
had employed its assets prior to the war. As early as 1935,
the British photographed Eritrea, Abyssinia, Cyrenaica, and
Sicily to monitor the Italo-Abyssinian conflict. By 13
November 1939, camera-equipped Spitfires 19 were operating as
dedicated reconnaissance platforms. Within the first six
months of the war, the British had photographed in excess of
7,500 square miles of enemy ground.-' (Heiman, 1972, p. 81)
"However, the United States entered World War II as it had
entered World War I - woefully unprepared in photo
19These assets were popularly known as the "Heston
Flight," because the aircraft were based at the Heston
Aerodrome
^ u It is significant to note that on 3 January 1940, the
RAF held a conference to discuss requirements for aerial
photography. The conference not only established a service
level aerial photography organization; it also ruled that "the
development of reconnaissance aircraft should always be kept
ahead of contemporary fighter performances." (Brookes, 1975,
p. 56)
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intelligence skills and collection capabilities." (Stanley,
1981, p. 36) The procrastination and low-prioritization with
which the American military infrastructure had approached the
development of aerial reconnaissance had manifested itself as
a clear tactical disadvantage - a handicap which would have to
be swiftly surmounted if any measure of combat effectiveness
was to be realized on the field of battle.
To this end, the U.S. Navy dispatched three officers 21 to
Medmenham, England (the photo reconnaissance headquarters of
the RAF) in the spring of 1941 with a singular purpose.
The Navy, seeing war clouds in the Pacific, recognized
that the tight security of the Japanese .. .meant that if
war came, they would have practically no intelligence with
which to work. A photo intelligence capability would be
needed on each carrier and amphibious force. (Heiman,
1972, p. 85)
After three months, the naval officers returned to the
United States and opened a photo interpreter school at
Anacostia Naval Air Station in Washington, D.C.
In the summer of 1941, the U.S. Army Air Corps also sent an
officer 22 to Britain; the Army was interested in collecting
information on aerial camera capabilities and photo
interpretation techniques. Subsequent to his trip, the Army
21The three officers were Lieutenant Commander Robert S.
Quackenbush, Jr., USN; Captain Charles Cox, USMC; and Captain
Gooderman McCormick, USMC. (see Heiman, pp. 84-85)
22The officer was Captain Harvey C. Brown, Jr.
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officer spearheaded the training of photo interpreters at
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. (Heiman, 1972, p. 85)
The impending war also brought long-overdue c ganizational
changes and hardware procurement efforts directed toward
enhancing the American aerial photography capability. Just
prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the U.S. Army
Air Force (USAAF) JJ established specifically organized,
equipped, and trained photo groups, and also placed a
dedicated reconnaissance squadron within each heavy bomber
group. In early 1942, the Boeing Aircraft Corporation began
producing reconnaissance variants of the B-17 Flying Fortress,
the first American military aircraft to be specifically
configured for aerial photography. Shortly thereafter, P-38
Lightning fighters were also modified for photo
reconnaissance. (Heiman, 1972, pp. 89-92)
The USAAF ' s 3rd Photo Group became the first American
aerial reconnaissance unit to see extensive action in the war.
After being deployed to North Africa in November 1942, the
Group became a component of the Combined Northwest Africa
Photographic Reconnaissance Wing, J4 which included RAF and
South African Air Force reconnaissance units. Under this
2iThe U.S. Army Air Corps had been redesignated the USAAF
prior to the war.
24The USAAF 3rd Photo Group Commanding Officer, Lieutenant
Colonel Elliot Roosevelt, was appointed Commanding Officer of
the Northwest Africa Photographic Reconnaissance Wing.
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organization, neophyte American reconnaissance aircrews and
photo interpreters gained valuable experience from their
seasoned Allied counterparts. 25
The 3rd Photo Group began operations with B-17s (called
F-9s in their reconnaissance configuration) and P-38Es,
but transitioned as soon as possible to exclusive use of
the advanced, better-performing P-38G/Hs (known as F-5As)
.
The later model Lightnings could fly twenty miles an hour
faster than their predecessors, four thousand feet higher,
and with two fuel tanks slung under their wings, four
times farther. (Burrows, 1986, p. 48)
American Aviation's P-51 Mustang (called the F-6 in its
reconnaissance variant) was also adapted for aerial
photography. With a speed of over 400 miles per hour, the F-6
was exceptionally popular with pilots tasked to fly low-
altitude missions (Burrows, 1986, p. 49). Later, "other
aircraft, such as the B-25 Mitchell and B-26 Marauder were
modified for reconnaissance duties to replace the slow flying
aircraft that were in the air support units at the beginning
of the war." (Heiman, 1972, p. 94) Over the course of the war,
no less than twenty aircraft had been modified and employed to
conduct aerial photography (see Table 1).
"Stanley remarks "fortunately, as during The Great War,
the United States found that its British allies were well on
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By the winter of 1944, each of the Army Air Forces had its
own armada of reconnaissance aircraft. Three combat groups,
each having three squadrons of twenty-five aircraft, worked
Italy and the Mediterranean. The Eighth and Ninth Air Forces
in England, which were bombing the continent on a massive
scale, had twenty reconnaissance squadrons between them, for
a total of nearly five hundred aircraft at strength. Seven
other squadrons flew photoreconnaissance missions in the
China-Burma-India theater. (Burrows, 1986, p. 50)
It was during the Second World War that the United States
Marine Corps initially employed aerial reconnaissance on a
significant scale. The first dedicated Marine Photographic
Squadrons, VMD-154 and VMD-254, were commissioned at San
Diego, California on 1 April 1942; both squadrons proved to be
vital to Marine operations in the Pacific.
VMD-154, equipped with the Corps' first four-engined
aircraft - the PB4Y-7P Liberator - and commanded by Lieutenant
Colonel Elliot F. Bard, commenced combat operations from
Espiritu Santo during October 1942. The newly formed squadron
immediately began assisting Army F-9s in photographing and
mapping the entire South Pacific to support theater amphibious
operations
.
In preparation for operations on Guadalcanal, VMD-154 used
modified F4F-7P Wildcats to photograph Japanese front lines
and installations, and from 19 October to 1 November 1942, the
squadron flew daily reconnaissance missions to produce the
first detailed photography of the enemy in the Pacific. 26 On
26Major Michael Sampas and Captain Herman A. Hansen flew
these missions.
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5 December 1942, VMD-154 provided conclusive photographic
evidence of Japanese airfield construction on the island of
Munda, in New Georgia; this discovery was the impetus for
strike operations which yielded the destruction of twenty-four
Zeros and nine occupied troop barges from 12 to 24 December
1942
.
27Later , on 26 January 1943, the squadron succeeded in
photographing the Puluwat Group, and thereby became the first
unit to penetrate the Truk area. (Sherrod, pp. 112, 123, and
460)
VMD-154 flew in excess of three hundred photo
reconnaissance missions over Japanese bases during operations
in the Solomon Islands alone. In recognition of VMD-154 's
vital contribution to Marine operations in the South Pacific,
the squadron was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation (PUC)
,
the highest award a military unit may receive. (Sherrod,
pp.428 and 460)
The other reconnaissance squadron commissioned in the
spring of 1942, VMD-254, deployed to Espiritu in November
1943, and gradually moved northward as the island hopping
campaign proceeded. On 4 February 1944, two VMD-254 PB4Y-7P
Liberators executed the first photo reconnaissance of the
"Commencing on 12 December, Marine Scout /Dive-bomber
Squadron 142 (VMSB-142) and Marine Fighter Squadron 121 (VMF-
121) operated on a daily basis, assisted by VMD-154 aerial
reconnaissance support , against Japanese logistics , equipment,
and personnel at Munda. (see Sherrod, p. 123)
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large Japanese base on Truk Atoll itself, in what has since
been described as the most daring photographic mission of the
entire war. 28 During their twelve-hour flight, the two
aircraft successfully photographed significant elements of the
Japanese combined fleet, as well as extensive aircraft
activity, despite heavy enemy fire. Thirteen days later, a
combined air and surface strike was launched against Truk,
based upon intelligence derived from VMD-254's bold
accomplishment. (Sherrod, pp. 205-206)
Three (Japanese) cruisers went down, and so did three
destroyers, 2 submarine tenders, an aircraft ferry, 6
tankers, 3 auxiliary cruisers, and 19 cargo vessels - a
total tonnage of more than 200,000. About 325 airplanes
were destroyed or damaged; so were storage facilities for
food and fuel. Truk was left all but defenseless by this
brilliant strike. (Sherrod, p. 206)
On 30 March 1944, VMD-254 headquarters moved to
Guadalcanal, and by 1 July of the same year, the squadron had
flown 260 combat photo missions over a number of important
targets, including Yap, Woleai, Guam, Truk, New Hanover, New
Ireland, New Britain, Green, Emirau, Ulithi, Solomons, and New
Hebrides. (Sherrod, p. 477)
Two additional Marine Photographic Squadrons were
commissioned later in the war: VMD-354 and VMD-954, on 1 July
1943 and 25 September 1944, respectively. From July 1945 until
28The pilots were Major James R. Christensen and Captain
James Q . Yawn
.
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the end of the war, VMD-354 operated from Peleliu, Ulithi, and
Okinawa. VMD-954 operated from Cherry Point, and later from
Greenville, North Carolina as the replacement training
squadron for photographic reconnaissance aircrews. (Sherrod,
p. 467)
"As the number of photo reconnaissance missions
proliferated in both theaters, so too, did qualitative
improvements in the photographic equipment itself." (Burrows,
1986, p. 50) A veritable flood of technical innovations
promised to greatly enhance the capability and value of aerial
photography: high resolution color film had been perfected,
and had been regularly employed throughout 1945; radar imaging
systems, which offered a day/night, all-weather capability,
had been introduced^ 9 ; and long focal length cameras, whose
lenses automatically compensated for air temperature and
atmospheric pressure fluctuations, had been invented. 3 '
Additionally, heat-sensitive infrared film, a medium with
29RAF Mosquitos were the first aircraft to employ radar
reconnaissance systems, (see Goddard, pp.322 and 328)
30In earlier cameras, temperature and pressure
fluctuations caused slight changes in the shape of the lenses;
this effect in turn produced distortion on the photograph.
Long focal length cameras (up to 240 inches) invented by
Harvard astronomer Dr. James Baker, effectively surmounted the
limitations of earlier systems, and therefore permitted
reconnaissance pilots to collect photography at higher, safer
altitudes, (see Goddard, pp. 327-328)
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camouflage-defeating properties, was in the advanced stages of
development. (Goddard, 1969, pp. 236, 322, and 327-328)
1. The Post-war Trend Continues
In 1945 it would have been difficult to find one
Army, Navy, or Marine officer in the U.S. military
establishment who would not have acknowledged the vital
importance of aerial reconnaissance. It had been a long,
difficult, uphill battle by the proponents of aerial
reconnaissance but it appeared they were finally
victorious by the end of World War II, that never again
would the United States be caught without the skilled
manpower and modern equipment necessary to fulfill the
aerial reconnaissance mission efficiently. It appeared
that way but it wasn't. The severe "economy" programs
between 1945 and 1950 took their toll of the established
aerial reconnaissance systems and prevented the required
research and development programs necessary if aircraft,
cameras, and technicians were to keep up with the fast-
moving jet age. (Infield, 1970, p. 134)
Once again, after conclusively proving to be a paramount
prerequisite for success in combat, aerial reconnaissance was
reduced to an issue of marginal significance during the post-
war demobilization period. Lacking the resources for continued
development, the doctrine, equipment, and personnel which
constituted the aerial reconnaissance capability within the
U.S. Armed Forces were left, at best, stagnant. As other tools
of war, especially the airplane, enjoyed extensive
improvement, the U.S. tactical photo reconnaissance capability
languished and effectively eroded. Furthermore, with the
advent of nuclear weapons, advances in intelligence technique
and hardware development were almost exclusively dedicated to
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supporting centralized strategic operations throughout the
decade following World War II; by design, this research did
not allocate resources to the improvement of tactical aerial
reconnaissance capabilities. (Infield, 1970, p. 225)
D. THE KOREAN WAR: DAWN OF THE JET AGE
"Fighter planes win battles, but photo reconnaissance
wins wars .
"
General "Hap" Arnold, USAF
(Benford, 1984, p. 138)
On 25 June 1950, 93,000 North Korean troops invaded South
Korea in an attempt to force reunification of the peninsula.
Under the auspices of the United Nations (UN) Security
Council, the United States moved to intervene, and by 3 July,
the first American forces - aircraft from Carrier Air Group
Five - were committed to the conflict. From the start, combat
in Korea promised to challenge the atrophied American military
forces, especially in the realm of aerial reconnaissance,
where the U.S. capability proved to be inadequate once again.
Certainly one of the greatest deficiencies was up-to-
date intelligence, and the fluid battle situation made the
problem more acute. In the early days of the conflict it
became obvious that, in this new war, aerial
reconnaissance would be of more importance than it had
been in previous wars. It also focused on the tragic
demobilization that occurred after World War II and the
impact of the atomic bomb and jet aircraft on tactical
reconnaissance. (Heiman, 1972, p. Ill)
"America's mood after VJ Day demanded virtually
instantaneous and total demobilization." (Hallion, 1986, p. 3)
But, while demobilization was effective in reducing the
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overall size of the armed forces, it was again ineffective in
preserving the relative significance among military
capabilities prescribed by recent experiences in combat.
Consequently, on the eve of yet another major conflict, the
U.S. Armed Forces were condemned to experience a lamentable
incongruity between tactical aerial reconnaissance
requirements and capabilities.
In the spring of 1949, the entire United States Air Force
could claim the equivalent of only one reconnaissance group:
two squadrons in the continental United States and one in the
Far East Air Forces (FEAF). J1 But the availability of even
such a modest stock of hardware was deceiving, for "much
American reconnaissance experience had evaporated as Pis
returned to civilian life and aircrews moved on to other
specializations; the shortage of trained manpower was
particularly noticeable at the outbreak of the Korean War."
(Brookes, 1975, pp. 219-220) The Air Force reconnaissance
capability was austere, at best.
Not surprisingly, the United States Army was even less
prepared to fulfill the reconnaissance requirements of the
forthcoming conflict.
31The FEAF was the U.S. Air Force component of the Far
East Command; it encompassed all Air Force installations in
the Far East, (see Mead, p. 26 for command relationships)
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Beginning its war in Korea, Eighth Army did not
possess even the shell of (an aerial reconnaissance)
system. There were no interpreters, no air crews
adequately trained for the mission, and no production
apparatus to process work had the specialists been
available. This service had (also) been one of the major
casualties of the breakneck demobilization of 1945-1946.
The machinery was junked or warehoused. The experts doffed
their uniforms and returned to their former tasks. They
could not be replaced overnight. (Marshall, 1953, p. 5)
Ironically, given the state of aerial reconnaissance in the
U.S. Armed Forces, it quickly became apparent that in this new
limited and politically scrutinized war, photo intelligence
would play a role greater than it had in World War II. Because
American military operations in Korea were developed and
executed in the context of prevailing diplomatic constraints,
and because American forces were restrained from any
intelligence collection which could appear provocative,
oblique and panoramic aerial cameras offered the primary means
by which enemy activity could be effectively monitored.
Additionally, lacking the requisite contingency plans and
topographic products to support combat operations in Korea,
U.S. Forces were compelled to rely upon aerial reconnaissance
to fill gaps in basic intelligence. (Infield, 1970, pp. 135-
136)
As a stopgap measure, on 9 July 1950 the 8th Tactical
Reconnaissance Squadron (TRS) 32 was moved from Yokota Air
Base (just outside Tokyo) to Itazuke Air Base (on Kyushu, the
32The 8th TRS was the FEAF reconnaissance squadron.
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closest air base to Korea) with the mission of providing photo
reconnaissance support for Eighth Army and Fifth Air Force
(FAF) 33 operations in Korea. However, such expedient efforts
proved unsuccessful.
Typical of the sad disarray of reconnaissance and the
necessary support, the RF-80As of the Eighth Tactical
Reconnaissance Squadron flew missions over Korea and upon
returning to their base at Itazuke, the negatives had to
be flown to the only reconnaissance technical squadron in
the Pacific, which was located at Yokota Air Base. Because
of bad weather, sometimes the finished pictures were not
delivered to units in Korea for a week. (Heiman, 1972,
p. 112)
In an attempt to improve aerial reconnaissance support for
the Eighth Army and FAF, the 162nd TRS - specialists in night
photography - and the 363rd Reconnaissance Technical Squadron
(RTS) were dispatched to Itazuke during August and September
1950. Despite the shortages of equipment, inexperience among
personnel, and general lack of efficiency which understandably
characterized FAF reconnaissance operations during this
initial period, a wealth of valuable intelligence was gleaned
from the available aerial photographs. (Infield, 1970, pp. 136-
137)
Perhaps the most notable aerial reconnaissance coup of
these tumultuous months, if not the entire war, was achieved
in support of the landing at Inchon. Once General MacArthur,
Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Korea, selected the port
33FAF, headquartered at Tokyo, was the largest subordinate
command of FEAF . (see Mead, p. 2 6 for command relationships)
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city of Inchon for an amphibious invasion, the U.S. Navy was
challenged with surmounting the hazards posed by the landing
area's extreme tides and submerged obstacles. The 8th TRS was
tasked with photographing the Inchon coast at various tidal
stages in order to accurately determine the optimal time and
place for the assault. Using a combination of stereo strip and
panoramic cameras, and flying at low level, the 8th TRS
acquired complete target coverage. After studying the film,
photo interpreters 34 accurately determined the height of the
seawall and underwater obstacles, and provided the vital data
to concerned, yet dubious naval officers. (Infield, 1970, pp
137-138)
All doubt was erased at 1730 hours on the evening of
September 15 when twenty-three waves of LVTs (tracked
landing vehicles), along with eight LSTs (tank landing
ships) made the beach assault. The 15-foot seawall
protecting the beach was easily surmounted by the Marines
because, just as the Pis had predicted, the tide was high
enough to permit scaling. Later evidence proved that (the
Pis) were correct in their predictions to within a few
inches. The Inchon landings were a magnificent success.
The North Koreans were taken by surprise and within ten
days, the North Korean People's Army, which had been near
victory, was broken and beaten... In all of military
history there was no more effective amphibious operation
and the success of the Inchon landings hinged on the
aerial photographs of the harbor obtained by the 8th
Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron. (Infield, 1970, p. 138)
34The photo interpreters who studied the film of Inchon
were Colonel Richard W. Philbrick, USAF, Mr. Donald J. Graves,
and Mr. Amrom H. Katz, all deployed to Korea from Wright
Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; these gentlemen were
considered to be among the most skilled photo analysts in the
world at the time, (see Infield, p. 138)
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In response to the overwhelming demand but limited
capability to produce aerial photography, the U.S. Air Force
commissioned an investigation of reconnaissance requirements
in Korea. 31 As a result of this study, the Air Force
activated the 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing in February
1951. The 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, the largest
organization of its type during the Korean War, included the
following existing and newly formed units: the 67th
Reconnaissance Group, the 8th TRS , the 12th TRS, the 15th TRS,
the 45th TRS, the 162nd TRS, the 543rd Tactical Support Group,
and the 363rd RTS . For its part, in accordance with a
reciprocal agreement 36 , the U.S. Army formed the 98th
Engineer Aerial Photo Reproduction Company and subordinated it
to the Eighth Army in July 1952. (Infield, 1970, pp. 133-143)
While the Army and Air Force seemed to have solved the
organizational impediments to effective aerial reconnaissance,
a significant technical problem persisted throughout the war.
The RF-80A, the workhorse of Air Force tactical reconnaissance
during the Korean War, was not equipped with suitable aerial
^Colonel Karl L. Polifka, USAF, a distinguished
reconnaissance pilot, was tasked with this study on 24 January
1951. He was subsequently placed in command of the 67th
Tactical Reconnaissance Wing in Korea, (see Infield, p. 141)
36The Army agreed to perform photo exploitation and
reproduction for ground units. Infield notes that "the Eighth
Army couldn't live up to the agreement during the first two
years of the conflict because they did not have the
technicians available." (p. 143)
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cameras. The RF-80A's cameras had been designed to operate
aboard conventional (propeller) aircraft, instead of faster
jet aircraft. Consequently, in order to acquire usable large
scale, overlapping photo coverage, the RF-80A pilot had to
decrease his speed over the target. Obviously, this technique
made the RF-80A an easy prey for enemy fighter aircraft and
anti-aircraft artillery. (Heiman, 1972, pp. 117-118 and
Infield, 1970, pp. 143-144)
It is significant to note that the technical limitations of
the RF-80A's cameras was a direct result of the post-war
neglect which plagued the development of reconnaissance
capabilities following both World Wars. Aerial reconnaissance
systems "would have been debugged by the time the Korean War
began, except for problems of getting the necessary money from
greatly reduced defense budgets." (Heiman, 1972, p. 118)
The same austere fiscal climate that remarkably funded
development of the costly jet aircraft engine failed to place
proportionate emphasis on the relatively inexpensive
development of aerial cameras. Given the well-defined trend
which, by then, governed the development of such systems, it
is not surprising that "the new war and... events on the
battlefield changed priorities overnight." (Heiman, 1972
,
p. 119)
The failure to concomitantly improve reconnaissance system
and aircraft performance capabilities again forced the
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American military establishment to reactively search for
suitable equipment to support forces in Korea. In the Air
Force, this shift in priority was woefully late, for the RF-
80A problem was never fully resolved. 37 (Heiman, 1972, p. 118
and Infield, 1970, p. 144)
Yet, notwithstanding initial organizational problems and
persistent technical limitations, U.S. Air Force photo
reconnaissance support was in overwhelming demand. Statistics
regarding the performance and output of comparable
reconnaissance units in the Second World War and the Korean
War reflect the progressively increasing significance which
military commanders placed on the capability (see Table 2)
.
The U.S. Navy experienced major difficulties in providing
aerial reconnaissance support to the fleet with its own
assets. Carrier-based detachments from Composite Squadron 61
(VC-61) were primarily employed to conduct bomb damage
assessment (BDA) photography. However, VC-61 's F9F-2P Panthers
could not operate effectively at high altitude, where photo
coverage and aircraft survivability were maximized.
Furthermore, the limited shipboard photo processing,
reproduction, and exploitation facilities were quickly swamped
i7The Air Force eventually modified the RF-86 Sabre with
newer cameras, but the aircraft could still not operate at
high speeds without collecting blurred photography.
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by even moderate volumes of photography. Navy procurement of
the F2H-2P Banshee, a more capable aircraft, surmounted the
altitude limitations of the Panther, but exacerbated the
TABLE 2
COMPARISON OF PERFORMANCE AND OUTPUT
FOR EQUIVALENT AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE UNITS
IN WORLD WAR II AND THE KOREAN WAR*
WORLD WAR II KOREAN WAR
MAXIMUM MISSIONS
PER MONTH 1,300 (April 1945) 2,400 (May 52
AVERAGE MONTHLY
SORTIE RATE 604 (1944-1945) 1,792 (52-53)
MAXIMUM PHOTO NEGATIVE
PRODUCTION PER YEAR 243,175 (9X9) 736,684 (9X18)
* World War II statistics are the highest figures for any
single reconnaissance group; Korean War statistics are for the
67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing. Unit sizes are comparable,
note difference in photo negative size.
(Source: Infield, 1970, pp. 153-154)
problem of adequate facilities. (Hallion, 1986, pp. 200-201)
To supplement its marginal capability, the Navy relied
heavily upon the 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing as well as
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Marine Photographic Squadron 1 (VMJ-1) to satisfy outstanding
reconnaissance requirements. (Infield, 1970, pp. 154-155)
VMJ-1, formed in February 1952, was based at K-3 Airfield
in Pohang, Korea.
Under FAF control until late in the war, the squadron's
550 mph F2H-2P twin-jet Banshees flew unarmed deep into
enemy country - even as far as the MiG-guarded Yalu -
photographing positions, airfields, power plants, and
other targets. An escort plane flew cover while the photo
ship took pictures. (Mead, 1972, p. 491)
VMJ-1 's Banshee, considered to be superior to the Air Force
reconnaissance aircraft, was credited with dramatically
improving the quality of aerial photography in the combat
theater
.
During operations in Korea, VMJ-1 achieved phenomenal
output levels. For Marine requirements alone, peak daily
output reached 5,000 prints; average monthly output was steady
at 100,000 prints. VMJ-1 's gross wartime output was 793,012
feet of processed aerial photos; in terms of ground coverage,
this figure was "equal to a continuous photographic strip six
and half times around the Earth at the equator." (Mead, 1972,
p. 491) Overall, the Marine squadron accounted for 33% of the
entire UN photo reconnaissance effort and at least 40% of all
FAF intelligence collection missions. 3 ' (Mead, 1972, pp.238,
348, and 491)
38VMJ-1 was under the operational control of FAF from
February 1952 until 1 July 1953, when it reverted to 1st
Marine Air Wing control.
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Throughout the Korean War, aerial reconnaissance proved to
be of greater importance and in higher demand than in any
previous conflict. "According to a survey made shortly after
the truce, air reconnaissance accounted for about 44 percent
of all intelligence used by ground units; in some cases, the
percentage was as high as 95." (Infield, 1970, p. 153)
These figures, as well as those in Table 2 suggest that
most aerial reconnaissance requirements were met during the
Korean War. But in reality, while the statistics reflect a
dramatically increased dependency on aerial reconnaissance,
the wartime demand for aerial photography far exceeded the
aggregate capabilities of all the U.S. Armed Forces.
The Korean reconnaissance experience forced the U.S. Navy
to reexamine its carrier-based aerial reconnaissance
capability. The Navy's Third Korean Evaluation Report stated:
"The prospects of similar requirements in operations of this
nature in the future should be recognized and increased
facilities provided; the ever-growing importance of aerial
photography to the carriers for intelligence must be
considered for future operations in other theaters." (Hallion,
1986, p. 201)
Near the end of the conflict, the U.S. Eighth Army revealed
that no more than seventy-five per cent of its wartime aerial
reconnaissance requirements were fulfilled, and warned that a
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similar unit would require five thousand negatives per day to
sustain operations in subsequent conflicts. (Infield, 1970,
p. 14)
1. Crisis Follows Demobilization
"Once the battles came to an end in Korea, however,
Eighth Army's warning was promptly forgotten and aerial
reconnaissance was (again) neglected in the military budget
and on planning boards." (Infield, 1970, p. 15) With the Cold
War in full swing, the U.S. military infrastructure focused
its fiscal resources on the almost exclusive development of
strategic capabilities, particularly on those assets and
techniques which would deter or prevail in the much
anticipated, cataclysmic confrontation between the United
States and the Soviet Union. As a result, "tactical
reconnaissance was allowed to decline to a point where the
lack of assets to provide low-altitude confirmation of the
presence of missile sites in Cuba became an embarrassment."
(Allen, 1990, p. 256)
During the Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962), the United
States initially relied upon the U-2, a high-altitude
strategic reconnaissance aircraft, for aerial photography of
suspected Soviet missile sites. However, as the U-2 became
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increasingly more threatened by surface-to-air missiles, y
and as the requirement for detailed, large scale photography
grew, it became apparent that a complementary tactical
reconnaissance system was needed to effectively monitor
developments in Cuba. The President of the United States
turned to the Air Force and the Navy for a solution. (Heiman,
1972, pp. 134-143)
The Tactical Air Command (TAC) of the U.S. Air Force
immediately deployed its twin-jet McDonnell RF-101 Voodoo, the
first supersonic photo reconnaissance aircraft, to conduct
low-level reconnaissance missions over Cuba in support of the
National Command Authority. The RF-101 proved to be ideal for
the task; flying at 300 feet AGL and at supersonic speeds, the
Voodoo could not only defeat the Cuban air defense systems,
but could also collect the necessary target coverage. But,
although the Voodoo clearly offered a vital capability during
the Cuban Missile Crisis, unfortunately only a small number of
the RF-101 aircraft had been procured by TAC.
For once, the United States had a reconnaissance aircraft
technologically capable of fully satisfying the requirements
of a national crisis, but shamefully few of these assets were
available. TAC had been a casualty of both the demobilization
39The Soviet SA-2 posed the greatest threat to the U-2 in
Cuba. The SA-2 was specifically designed to intercept aircraft
at high altitude. The system's effectiveness was greatly
reduced at low altitudes.
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which followed the war in Korea and the strategic emphasis
which, by then, governed the allocation of fiscal resources.
Most of the money which had been allotted to the development
and procurement of tactical airpower during the war had
subsequently been spent on the strategic missile program.
(Heiman, 1972, pp. 141-142)
Shortly after the Cuban Missile Crisis highlighted the
lamentable degree to which the American tactical aerial
reconnaissance capability had eroded, the U.S. military
community began to turn its attention toward another volatile
region: Southeast Asia. Together, the Missile Crisis
experience and the prospect of intervention in Vietnam
provided the impetus for redevelopment of a viable tactical
aerial reconnaissance capability among the military services
(Allen, 1990, p.256). 40 Once again, U.S. aerial
reconnaissance was subjected the familiar crash development
program on the eve of war, instead of a progressive program of
improvement based upon proven and consistent requirements.
In response, the Air Force established the Tactical Aerial
Reconnaissance Center (TARC) at Shaw Air Force Base, South
40This process commenced with President Kennedy's adoption
of "flexible response, " a new national military strategy which
emphasized the concomitant development of nuclear and
conventional forces. Heiman notes that under the President's
new strategy "TAC began receiving. . .reconnaissance aircraft to
augment its relatively few RF-lOls. It was well that this
happened because a small war in Southeast Asia was fanning
hotter." (Heiman, p. 142)
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Carolina on 8 February, 1963 with the mission of keeping
aerial reconnaissance forces fully updated and prepared to
fulfill the requirements of the U.S. Armed Forces. The TARC
was tasked with conducting the test and evaluation of tactical
aerial reconnaissance systems; it was also responsible for
developing new doctrine, organizations, tactics, and
techniques. However, despite the seemingly long-range focus of
the TARC, the majority of the center's projects were
necessarily focused upon meeting the immediate needs of the
forthcoming conflict in Vietnam. (Infield, 1970, p. 15) In this
respect, the TARC was not the manifestation of a proactive
approach to aerial reconnaissance, but instead was a central
coordination facility for the pre-war crash development
program.
E. THE VIETNAM WAR: THE ADVENT OF MULTISENSOR RECONNAISSANCE
In the early 1960 's, aerial reconnaissance provided a
reliable means of monitoring activity in Vietnam41 without
arousing serious political objections from other major powers.
However, as the United States contemplated direct intervention
in Vietnam, it became increasingly more apparent that the
available capability was less than optimal.
41The first U.S. military aircraft used in Vietnam were
RF-8A reconnaissance aircraft launched from the deck of the
USS Midway, (see Mersky & Polmar, p. 10)
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As in previous wars, aerial reconnaissance immediately
became much in demand by the commanders of troops on the
ground. For several years prior to the entry of U.S.
forces into the fighting, concentrated development
programs had been underway to prepare the U.S. Armed
Forces with special capabilities for counterinsurgency
warfare. At the start of the United States' involvement,
the (American military services) were not unprepared, but
they had not yet solved the big problem of the peculiar
type of reconnaissance then in demand... The foe used the
protection of the jungle canopy whenever possible. Thus,
the reconnaissance requirement was vastly different from
what had been experienced before. In addition, the enemy
placed heavy reliance on nighttime operations. (Heiman,
1972, 142-143)
Consequently, an incredible research and development effort
was reactively focused on using technologies such as lasers,
infrared sensors, and side-looking airborne radar (SLAR) to
solve the problems of aerial reconnaissance in Vietnam. It is
significant to note that while such sophisticated sensing
techniques had been developed, they had not been fully adapted
for military use, due to the previous lack of emphasis and
paucity of funding for such endeavors.
It is reasonable to conclude that, had aerial
reconnaissance been assigned a peacetime priority commensurate
with its wartime impact, advanced reconnaissance sensors would
have been fully integrated into the U.S. military capability
well before the deployment of American naval forces to
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Vietnamese waters in 1961. Instead, "multisensor imagery
reconnaissance" 42 was placed in accelerated development.
"For the next ten years, all the services increased and
modernized their tactical reconnaissance capabilities."
(Allen, 1990, p. 256) The U.S. Navy conceived the Integrated
Operational Intelligence System, a program which involved the
development of a multisensor reconnaissance aircraft in
conjunction with an associated carrier-based intelligence
processing capability. The Navy ultimately developed the RA-5C
Vigilante, an A-5A heavy bomber modified to carry optical,
infrared, and SLAR sensors, as well as an increased fuel
load. 4iThe RA-5C was specifically designed to work with the
Integrated Operational Intelligence Center (IOIC), which was
installed aboard larger (i.e. Forrestal-class) carriers. The
IOIC was equipped with state-of-the-art imagery processing and
exploitation equipment, and was capable of producing finished
prints within ten minutes of the reconnaissance aircraft's
42
"Multisensor imagery reconnaissance" refers to an aerial
reconnaissance capability which includes electronic sensors
(i.e. infrared, SLAR) in addition to optical sensors
(cameras) . Beginning with the advent of multisensor systems,
the all-inclusive term "imagery" was applied to the products
of aerial reconnaissance; from then on, "aerial photography"
was correctly used to describe only the products of optical
sensors
.
43The first operational detachment of RA-5Cs was a 6-
aircraft detachment of Reconnaissance/Attack Squadron 5, which
deployed aboard the USS Ranger in July 1964.
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return to the carrier. 44 At the peak of the war in Vietnam,
the U.S. Navy operated ten RA-5C squadrons. (Heiman, 1972,
p. 226 and Mersky & Polmar, 1981, pp. 153-154)
However, the RA-5C was not without problems. The aircraft's
highly sophisticated electronic equipment demanded intensive
maintenance support, while its reconnaissance systems required
special pre-flight preparation; together, these constraints
often limited the immediacy with which the Vigilante could
respond to support requests in a dynamic environment. These
limitations can be directly attributed to the "crash"
development program which yielded the Vigilante. (Mersky &
Polmar, 1981, pp. 153-156)
The Navy also funded production of the RF-8G, a variant of
the RF-8A Crusader. Delivered in 1965, the RF-8G had enhanced
aircraft performance and reconnaissance system capabilities,
but the modified Crusader still lacked several significant
characteristics which had become crucial to the viability of
reconnaissance aircraft : low-level speed, all-weather sensors
,
and a navigator 45 .
44Note that the IOIC's capability to deliver prints within
ten minutes, although impressive for its era, is somewhat
misleading. The ten minute figure accounted only for imagery
processing and printing time, and assumed a single target
mission; it did not account for exploitation, reporting, and
annotation, nor did it apply to multi-target missions.
45In reconnaissance aircraft, the navigator assumes
responsibility for operation of the reconnaissance systems, as
well as for navigation of the mission; the pilot retains
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The U.S. Marine Corps, in response to the new aerial
reconnaissance requirements created by the war in Vietnam,
procured the RF-4B in 1965. 46 The RF-4B was a multisensor
reconnaissance variant of the highly successful F-4B Phantom
II; it was specifically developed for the Marine Corps, and it
provided remarkable service in Vietnam. (Boyne, 1985, p. 87)
The big RF-4B provided greater power, twin-engine
safety, two crewmen, and a variety of imagery sensors
never before available to the Marines. Additionally, the
reconnaissance Phantom was capable of acquiring imagery at
night, an improvement over the RF-8, whose after-dark
capabilities were severely limited and seldom used.
(Mersky, 1983, p. 222)
(The capabilities of the RF-4B are discussed in detail later.)
The U.S. Air Force also acquired a Phantom II variant, the
RF-4C, in significant quantities to replace its meager and
aging reconnaissance aircraft inventory. The capabilities of
the RF-4C were virtually identical to those of the RF-4B.
In Vietnam, Aerial reconnaissance proved to be more vital
to the intelligence effort than ever before. 47 It often
provided the only means of monitoring the status of enemy
responsibility for flying and maneuvering the aircraft. This
division of labor yields enhanced aircraft survivability and
optimal mission results, (see Infield, p. 228 for discussion of
the significance of the RA-5C navigator)
46The RF-4B first flew on 12 March 1965; the first
aircraft was delivered to the Marine Corps in May 1965. (see
Boyne, 1985, p. 160)
47Mersky & Polmar note that "the importance of aerial
reconnaissance in Vietnam cannot be overstressed. " (p. 150)
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forces and supply routes. The need for aerial reconnaissance
was perhaps most strongly demonstrated during the Christmas
truce periods, especially prior to the Tet Offensive and after
the 1 November 1968 bombing halt; while most of the American
forces enjoyed a holiday standdown during these periods, the
aerial reconnaissance assets were operating at a high tempo.
"While fighter and attack aircraft's exploits took most of the
headlines, on a day-to-day basis, . . .the reconnaissance planes
carried a large burden of the war effort." (Mersky & Polmar,
1981, pp.150 and 157)
A sampling of operational statistics reveals the magnitude
of the demand for aerial reconnaissance in Vietnam: the U.S.
Air Force's 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing recorded a
record monthly output of 4,650,000 feet of imagery for one of
its squadrons, while VMCJ-1 completed 4,500 combat
reconnaissance sorties between 1965 and 1970. (Infield, 1970,
p. 249 and Mersky, 1983, p. 244)
"Overall, the first real improvements in the capability of
tactical reconnaissance since World War II occurred during the
Vietnam War." (Fulbright, 1987, p. 9) Advanced systems such as
infrared and SLAR sensors greatly expanded imagery collection
options by eliminating the sanctuary which darkness and foul
weather normally provided the enemy.
Still, the Southeast Asia experience highlighted serious
deficiencies in the U.S. aerial reconnaissance capability. The
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war in Vietnam was characterized by poorly defined fronts and
an elusive enemy; this environment made the timely
dissemination of intelligence derived from aerial
reconnaissance a paramount requirement. In the later stages of
the war, computerized and standardized exploitation reports
were introduced, and these structured reporting procedures
ultimately enhanced the speed with which information was
disseminated. 48 (Fulbright, 1987, pp. 9-12)
However, it is significant to note that operational
commanders increasingly sought (and continue to seek) imagery
products; aerial reconnaissance reporting alone failed to meet
the commanders' expectations of adequate support. In Vietnam,
imagery products - prints - were rarely delivered to ground
commanders in time to be of significance to the battle. Thus,
although tremendous improvements in sensor capabilities
emerged during the Vietnam War, the U.S. aerial reconnaissance
was clearly plagued by an inefficient and unresponsive product
dissemination system. (Fulbright, 1987, pp. 9-12)
Furthermore, the proliferation of highly sophisticated air
defense systems, such as mobile surface-to-air missiles and
radar-controlled anti-aircraft guns fueled concerns about the
4cFulbright notes that this development was a "mixed
blessing" because it also established direct computer links
with Pacific Command and Washington D.C. intelligence
agencies, thereby providing a conduit for direct tasking from
such agencies, (p. 10)
57
survivability of traditionally unarmed reconnaissance
aircraft. By the end of the war in Vietnam, American
operational commanders had begun to openly question the
tactical reconnaissance force's ability to provide timely
intelligence support and to survive in emerging high threat
environments. (Montgomery, 1981, p. 9)
1 . The Final Drawdown
The fresh concerns which arose during the war were
exacerbated by the resurgence of some familiar issues
following the conflict. Despite the operational impact of
aerial reconnaissance in combat, a career as a reconnaissance
pilot offered slim hope for advancement. In the Navy,
...no RF-8 pilot who stayed within the light photo
reconnaissance community was given command of an air
group, and only a select few of the RA-5C flight crews
reached that position. VFP detachments aboard carriers
were normally commanded by no higher rank than a
lieutenant commander, while the larger fighter and attack
squadrons were led by full commanders; the air wings
counted senior commanders and junior captains at their
head. Even though he had charge of what amounted to a
small squadron, with its accompanying responsibilities,
the of f icer-in-charge of a photo detachment was still a
junior officer in charge of a support group and was not in
the right pipeline for command. (Mersky & Polmar, 1981,
p. 159)
Similar attitudes prevailed in both the Air Force and
Marine Corps, and had the net effect of eroding the corporate
knowledge and experience which had accumulated in the tactical
reconnaissance communities during the war. Pilots and
specialists alike intentionally departed the reconnaissance
vocation for more promising career paths in a manner
remarkably reminiscent of the post-World War II exodus.
The typical organizational changes were also forced upon
the reconnaissance force following the Vietnam War. A
significant amount of the by then formidable Air Force
reconnaissance capability was gradually shifted to the
reserves and Air National Guard. The Navy's dedicated
reconnaissance squadrons were disbanded, and the multi-mission
F-14 Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance Pod System (TARPS)
squadrons were introduced as an "interim" capability. 49
(Allen, 1990, p. 256) And, finally, the Marine Corps reduced
its capability from three composite reconnaissance squadrons
to one consolidated imagery reconnaissance squadron.
The Marine Corps' post-Vietnam aerial reconnaissance
organization was quantitatively inferior to the wartime
capability; nevertheless, the singular imagery reconnaissance
4yThe stated objective of the TARPS program was to provide
an interim aerial reconnaissance capability to the fleet after
the retirement of the aging RA-5C and until the introduction
of a "follow-on" dedicated reconnaissance aircraft. The multi-
mission nature of the TARPS squadrons ultimately resulted in
a degradation of the Navy's reconnaissance capability, because
aircrew could no longer focus on reconnaissance alone (this
phenomenon will be further discussed later). The Navy's
continued reliance on TARPS, an interim solution, reflects the
tacit priority ascribed to the development and deployment of
the "follow-on" capability. It is unlikely that TARPS will be
replaced prior to 1995, the currently projected year for
initial operational capability (IOC) of the Advanced Tactical
Air Reconnaissance System (ATARS)
.
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squadron provided the foundation for the Marine Corps Imagery
Intelligence Architecture for fifteen years.
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III. THE MARINE CORPS IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE
"In peacetime, no one cares about the capability, but
as soon as the bullets start to fly, what do they
need? ... they need ' tac recce'."
Lieutenant General Charles Pittman, USMC
(Pittman, 1992)
Successful imagery intelligence operations are based upon
a continuous cycle of collection, processing/production,
exploitation, and dissemination. Following the war in Vietnam,
the Marine Corps organized two interdependent units - Marine
Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron Three and the Force Imagery
Interpretation Unit - to provide the requisite capabilities
for a viable Marine imagery intelligence architecture.
A. "THE EYES OF THE CORPS"
Marine Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron Three (VMFP-3) was
commissioned on 1 July 1975 as a component of the Third Marine
Aircraft Wing (3rd MAW) at Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) El
Toro, California. VMFP-3 's assigned mission was to "conduct
aerial multisensor imagery reconnaissance, to include aerial
photographic, infrared, and side-looking airborne radar
reconnaissance in support of Fleet Marine Force (FMF)
operations." The organization quickly became known as "The
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Eyes Of The Corps." (Fagan, 1992, p . 1 ) so In amplification of
its stated mission, the squadron was specifically tasked with
the following responsibilities:
1. Conduct day and night multisensor imagery
reconnaissance
.
2. Conduct aerial prestrike and poststrike multisensor
imagery reconnaissance for targeting and damage
assessment
.
3 . Maintain the capability of operating from aircraft
carriers, advanced bases, and expeditionary airfields
within the capability of assigned aircraft.
4. Maintain the capability of operating during darkness
and under instrument flight conditions.
5. Provide for the production and reproduction of aerial
multisensor imagery obtained by organic aircraft, within
the capability of assigned laboratory equipment.
6. Maintain the capability of deployment or extended
operations involving aerial refueling.
7. Deploy detachments aboard aircraft carriers, to
advanced bases, or to expeditionary airfields as directed.
8. Process and provide aerial imagery to wing and/or
Commander Landing Force
.
9. Provide liaison personnel to wing and landing force
staffs for assistance in VMFP-3 employment planning.
10. Perform organizational maintenance on assigned
aircraft. (Fagan, 1992, p.l)
Although initial training for Marine reconnaissance
aircrews was frequently provided by U.S. Air Force
reconnaissance squadrons, VMFP-3 acted as its own training
squadron to fulfill the unique training syllabus required to
ensure the provision of effective support for amphibious
forces. Accordingly, the squadron exclusively represented the
Marine Corps' corporate knowledge and operational experience
in aerial reconnaissance. (Fagan, 1992, p. 2)




VMFP-3 regularly deployed detachments in response to a
variety of support requirements, including national, fleet,
and exercise taskings 51 (Table 3 lists VMFP-3 detachment
deployments for the four year period from 1984 through 1987) .
Thus, it was not uncommon for VMFP-3 to have three detachments
deployed while simultaneously conducting basic aircrew
training. Finally, in addition to training and operational
commitments, the squadron was tasked with conducting test and
evaluation of reconnaissance systems for the Marine Corps.
On an organizational level, VMFP-3 clearly played a vital
role in the development and maintenance of an aerial
reconnaissance capability within the Corps; on a tactical
level, the squadron contributed the imagery collection and
production elements - the RF-4B Phantom II reconnaissance
aircraft and the ES-40A Mobile Photographic Processing
Facility, respectively - which were crucial to the Marine
Imagery Intelligence Architecture in the post-Vietnam years.
51VMFP-3 also participated in the peace-time aerial
reconnaissance program (PARPRO), a national-level collection
program; the squadron also permanently deployed a detachment
aboard the USS Midway until 1984.
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TABLE 3
VMFP-3 DEPLOYMENTS FROM 1984 THROUGH 1987
1984







Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) Exercise 1-84, 2-84
1985
Bushwacker 1-85







CAX 1-86, 5-86, 10-86
Constant Peg 86





CAX 1-87, 2-87, 3-87, 6-87





(Source: VMFP-3 Command Chronology
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1. The RF-4B Phantom II
The twin-seat RF-4B was powered by two General Electric
J79-GE-8 turbojet engines, which yielded 16,500 pounds of
thrust each (in afterburner) and produced a maximum level
speed in excess of Mach 2, with external aircraft stores. In
the ground attack mode, 52 the RF-4B had a combat radius of
over 1,600 kilometers. (Taylor & Munson, 1978, p. 373 and
Taylor, 1969, p. 376)
The reconnaissance version of the Phantom II, like its
fighter counterpart, carried a pilot and a navigator in
tandem. However, the RF-4B was not equipped with dual
controls, nor was it configured to accept armament. Therefore,
the RF-4B navigator was designated a "Reconnaissance Systems
Officer" (RSO) , and was given responsibility for the operation
of on-board reconnaissance sensors.
The RF-4B's imagery systems were installed in five internal
sensor stations located below and forward of the cockpit. All
aircraft were capable of carrying a variety of optical and
electronic imagery sensors (see Figure 1). The Phantom's
reconnaissance systems provided the Marine Corps with the
S2A ground attack profile is appropriate for assessing the
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Figure 1: RF-4B Reconnaissance Systems
(Source: McDonnel-Douglas , 1983, p. 4)
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flexibility to support a broad spectrum of missions, including
all altitude, stand-off, wide area, day/night, and all weather
reconnaissance
.
The RF-4B's optical sensors were capable of employing black
and white (panchromatic) , color, panchromatic infrared, and
camouflage detection infrared (CDIR) films. 5 ' The cameras
were designed to collect imagery in stereo at high speeds and
during defensive maneuvers, if required. One camera was able
to process panchromatic film while airborne, and subsequently
eject a film canister to ground forces. Later developments
yielded a tri-lens camera and a 60-inch focal length long
range optical (LOROP) system for the RF-4B. 54
The aircraft's electronic sensors were capable of
penetrating the shroud of night or weather to detect enemy
activity. The thermal infrared line scanner (IRLS) and SLAR
systems effectively expanded the Marine commander's scope of
vision beyond the visible spectrum and facilitated 24-hour
imagery collection operations. The SLAR system had a "moving
target indicator" (MTI) feature which automatically
53Each film type had specific applications. Panchromatic
was best suited for high resolution and mensuration
requirements (it was the most widely used film); color was
used for terrain analysis requirements; panchromatic infrared
was employed to detect thermal emitters; and CDIR was utilized
to locate camouflaged positions and/or equipment.
54The KS-153 tri-lens camera facilitated wide area
coverage, while the KS-127 LOROP system permitted stand-off
(up to 30 nautical miles) oblique coverage.
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highlighted moving vehicles in the target area. A later
modification to the RF-4B SLAR enabled the system to down-link
radar imagery in near-real-time to a ground station over 150
miles away. "Hiding anything from this aircraft, when all
systems were deployed, was virtually impossible." (Fagan,
1992, p. 2)
The RF-4B's reconnaissance sensors were supplemented by the
Airborne Data Annotation System (ADAS) , a device which
superimposed vital reference data on each frame of exposed
imagery. The ADAS annotated the RF-4B imagery with a "code
matrix block" EE in the upper left corner of each frame. The
small (1" X.5") code matrix block consisted of three major
columns of dots which represented the reconnaissance mission
data. (The code matrix block is illustrated in Figure 2) . The
date, taking unit, sortie/project number, and sensor
identification were pre-set by the RF-4B ground crew, while
the remaining information (altitude, heading, drift, roll,
pitch, time, latitude, and longitude) was provided and updated
in-flight by the aircraft's inertial navigation system (INS).
The code matrix block was instrumental to the provision of
timely imagery intelligence support; its machine-readable
format facilitated automatic target location and mission
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plotting by advanced imagery exploitation systems (see
discussion of the AN/TYQ-12 Imagery Interpretation Facility
below)
.
All imagery acquired by the RF-4B, regardless of the
imaging sensor, was recorded on film and had to be processed
prior to exploitation. For finished imagery products, the
processed film had to be enlarged and printed. 56
2. The ES-40A Mobile Photographic Processing Facility
The ES-40A Mobile Photographic Processing Facility - a
deployable, precision aerial photographic laboratory
provided VMFP-3's imagery processing and production
capability. The ES-40A consisted of four 10 X 10 X 20 foot
shelters: two processing shelters, one administration shelter,
and one refrigeration shelter. The processing shelters, which
comprised the heart of the ES-40A, contained the wet-film
processing, printing, and production equipment 5,7 required to
transform the RF-4B's raw imagery into products suitable for
imagery analysis. The administration shelter provided the ES-
40A with office space, while the refrigeration shelter
56Note that the production of a contact print, that is a
roll of imagery printed directly from the roll of film, did
not require enlargement. Contact prints were used to construct
imagery mosaics of large area targets.
57The ES-40A processing shelters included two Versamat
Continuous Roll Processers, an EN-52C Projection Enlarger, a
Kokomo Contact Printer, and a print dryer.
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provided storage for the facility's consumable stock (i.e.
duplication film, photographic paper, and processing
chemicals) . For SLAR operations, the ES-40A was augmented by
an additional facility which reconstructed the radar data into
• c ftimagery
.
The ES-40A required specific logistical support for
operation, including a fresh water supply (approximately 1
gallon per minute at 40 pounds per square inch) , a frequent
resupply of chemicals (120 gallons of fixer and developer per
day) , and a constant electrical power source (usually a MEP-9
generator)
.
The ES-40A was staffed by trained photographic technicians,
as well as equipment maintenance personnel. Together, VMFP-3's
photographic processing equipment and personnel comprised a
section known as "photo line." Every squadron detachment was
accompanied by an appropriately-sized complement of photo line
assets
.
After having been collected and processed by the RF-4B and
ES-40A, VMFP-3's imagery was delivered to the Marine imagery
exploitation organization - the Force Imagery Interpretation
Unit (FIIU) - for completion of the imagery intelligence
cycle
.
58This facility, also housed in a 10 X 10 X 20 foot
shelter, was known as the "SLAR correlator."
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B. THE FORCE IMAGERY INTERPRETATION UNIT
The FIIU was formed in September 1983, in an effort to
consolidate the imagery exploitation expertise which had
previously been resident in the Marine divisions and air
wings." 1 Three FIIUs were organized to provide each Marine
Expeditionary Force (MEF) with multisensor imagery
interpretation support; a fourth FIIU was established in the
U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (USMCR). 60
The FIIU was equipped with the AN/TYQ-12 Imagery
Interpretation Facility (IIF), an imagery exploitation system
which had been specifically designed to work with imagery
obtained from the RF-4B's reconnaissance sensors. The IIF was
a mobile, rugged facility capable of deploying to the field by
air, land, or sea; the system was sized to support the imagery




59The Marine divisions and air wings maintained organic
imagery exploitation expertise in the Photographic Imagery
Interpretation Units and the Photographic Imagery
Interpretation Branches, respectively.
60lst FIIU (III MEF) is located at Marine Corps Base Camp
Butler, Okinawa; 2nd FIIU (II MEF) is located at MCAS Cherry
Point, North Carolina; 3rd FIIU (I MEF) is located at MCAS El
Toro, California; and 4th FIIU (USMCR) is located at Buckley
Air National Guard Base, Denver, Colorado. Note that the MEF
was designated the Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) until 1987.
"The MEB was known as the Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB)
until 1987.
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The IIF was housed in one 10 X 10 X 20 foot steel shelter;
the system included two automated imagery workstations for
exploitation operations, two microcomputers for report
drafting, a line plotter for overlay preparation, a
minicomputer for database storage, and an encrypted
communications interface for report dissemination.
The automated imagery workstations comprised the core of
the IIF. Each workstation consisted of a light table 62with
magnification optics, a map board with cross-wires, and a code
matrix block reader. When used in conjunction with properly
annotated film, the workstation allowed the analyst to quickly
and accurately determine the location of a desired target on
both the film and reference map
.
6J
The FIIU maintained a variety of other exploitation
equipment, including standard light tables to support fixed
site operations and man-portable light tables for
62A light table is the equipment with which an imagery
analyst views transparent imagery. A simple light table
consists of a translucent sheet of glass or plastic atop a
diffused light source and an optical, usually binocular,
magnification system.
6iNote that target location, not exploitation, is
generally the most consuming task inherent to imagery
analysis. The IIF workstation concept facilitated more timely
imagery intelligence support by drastically reducing the time
required for target location. By reading the code matrix block
data, the system automatically advanced the film roll (which
could be 1000. feet long) to the appropriate frame and
simultaneously moved the reference map cross-wires to the
accurate map location.
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expeditionary operations. It is significant to note that the
FIIU had no organic capability to effect timely dissemination
of imagery reports and products. Despite repeated attempts to
acquire appropriate equipment, the exploitation organization
had neither communications gear to facilitate report
transmission, nor vehicles to deliver imagery products.
Consequently, the FIIU was entirely dependent upon external
support for dissemination.
In addition to its primary mission of supporting FMF
operations, the FIIU was responsible for conducting continuous
imagery exploitation training, maintaining the MEF imagery
archive, and conducting test and evaluation of prototypical
imagery exploitation and dissemination systems.
The FIIU commander was a Marine captain who had been
trained as an imagery analyst . Imagery analysts comprised the
bulk (80%) of the FIIU staff. All Pis received a minimum of
six months of a basic imagery exploitation training syllabus;
most completed ten months of formal training."' 4 Equipment
technicians and administrative clerks comprised the remainder
of the FIIU staff.
b4Marine imagery analysts are trained by the U.S. Air
Force Air Training Command at Goodfellow AFB, Texas, where the
six-month Basic Imagery Analyst Course and the four-month
Defense Sensor Interpretation Application Training Program are
offered.
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Third FIIU at MCAS El Toro, California, was unique among
the other exploitation units. As a result of its proximity to
VMFP-3, 3rd FIIU developed an especially close working
relationship with the reconnaissance squadron's aircrew and
photo technicians. And since it was subordinate to I MEF, 3rd
FIIU had the distinctive responsibility of providing
simultaneous planning and operational support to two
geographically separated MEBs. 65
Thus, 3rd FIIU worked directly with VMFP-3 on a regular
basis, while the other FIIUs did so only during periodic
deployments; and 3rd FIIU maintained two AN/TYQ-12 IIFs, while
the others each had only one. 66
VMFP-3 's RF-4B and ES-40A, together with the FIIU's IIF
provided the FMF with a comprehensive imagery intelligence
architecture; these assets represented the pinnacle of the
Marine Corps' tactical aerial reconnaissance capability in the
post-Vietnam years.
C. THE CALM BEFORE THE STORM
Although VMFP-3 provided an effective, dedicated aerial
reconnaissance capability to the Marine Corps from its debut
655th MEB and 7th MEB, both subordinate to I MEF, are
responsible for contingencies in the U.S. Southern Command and
U.S. Central Command theaters of operation, respectively.
66The author served as Commander, 3rd FIIU from January
1989 through June 1991.
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in the FMF, and "The Eyes Of The Corps" were in constant
demand for support of Marine exercises and operations around
the globe, the RF-4B and ES-40A were never viewed as optimal
capabilities by some consumers. By the early 1980s, critics
began to articulate dissatisfaction with the available Marine
tactical reconnaissance assets on three interrelated points.
First, VMFP-3's Phantoms were rapidly approaching twenty
years of service. Most of the squadron's aircraft had already
been overhauled through the Naval Aircraft Rework Facility's
Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) at least once, and the
aircraft had begun to demonstrate an increasing need for
intensive maintenance to remain operational. Spares had become
scarce and cannibalization of aircraft for parts became
commonplace
.
Second, the RF-4B reconnaissance sensors all employed film-
based recording media. Film obtained from the Phantom's
optical and electronic systems had to be returned to base,
downloaded, and processed before exploitation operations could
commence. And while the analyst's textual report could
conceivably be transmitted within minutes of its completion,
the delivery of photographic products could take hours or
days, depending upon the availability of courier assets.
(Table 4 illustrates the typical collection to dissemination
time for film-based reconnaissance systems) . Accordingly, the
































efficient systems capable of meeting the requirements of a
dynamic environment.
Finally, the RF-4B was inextricably linked to the ES-40A,
and operation of the photo lab levied unique logistical
requirements, including transportation, fresh water,
photographic chemicals, and waste disposal. 67
It is significant to note that, as the RF-4B was subjected
to increasingly harsh criticism, the ADAS - the vital link
between the reconnaissance aircraft and the exploitation
system - became a chronic problem for VMFP-3 maintenance
personnel and FIIU imagery analysts alike. The ADAS was
reliant upon the RF-4B INS for its positional data; however,
since the INS was one among many of the aircraft's frequently
failing avionic systems, it was often incapable of providing
accurate data. Consequently, the FIIU's IIF was often of no
great utility, as the imagery analysts were forced to revert
to time-consuming, manual target location and mission plotting
techniques
.
ADAS malfunction in the RF-4B eventually became so frequent
that the system's failure was ultimately accepted as a
somewhat ordinary condition during pref light checks, and
"For transportation, the ES-40A required 3 C-130 lifts;
for operations, the system needed an electrical power source,
approximately 1 gallon of fresh water per minute at 40 pounds
per square inch, 120 gallons of photographic fixer and




accurate ADAS data became an "exception to the rule." In fact,
a non-functional ADAS, although a serious impediment to the
provision of timely imagery intelligence support, was not
considered sufficient grounds to declare an aircraft "down"
for maintenance. Interestingly, U.S. Air Force RF-4Cs of
similar age were able to provide accurate ADAS data during
this same period.
The chronic RF-4B ADAS failure, when contrasted with the
fully operational RF-4C ADAS, seemed to suggest that the
system had not been given an appropriate priority in VMFP-3's
maintenance schedule. In fact, imagery analysts widely
interpreted this situation as evidence of a preoccupation with
flight hours and a concomitant lack of emphasis on the
reconnaissance mission within the squadron, not an inherent
characteristic of the RF-4B. Nevertheless, the ADAS issue
provided RF-4B critics with yet another topic of concern.
In addition to the perceived limitations of the RF-4B and
ES-40A, military technological developments stimulated
increased dissatisfaction with film-based aerial
reconnaissance among a growing constituency within the Marine
Corps. Dramatic increases in both the mobility and lethality
of weapons systems, combined with the advent of precision,
high-value attack systems prescribed the need for detailed,
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timely intelligence. The RF-4B, with its film-dependent
sensors, did not offer a solution to forthcoming challenges.
(Montgomery, 1981, pp. 9-10)
At the same time (in the early 1980s), alternative
technologies for collecting aerial imagery, especially sensor
developments, were emerging and offering potential solutions
to the perceived problems of the RF-4B.
The introduction of the charge coupled device (CCD), 68 a
solid-state, photon-sensitive element which facilitated the
construction of rugged, large focal plane digital sensors,
imparted considerable momentum to the quest for a near-real-
time imagery system.
CCD sensors offer the inherent advantages over traditional
optical sensors listed below:
1. geometric precision and stability; geometric distortion
is virtually absent from the CCD focal plane, and the
sensor has only a minor temperature dependence. 6 '
2. high sensitivity; especially when cooled, the CCD sensor
can be up to one hundred times more sensitive than
68Although it had been developed in the early 1970s, the
CCD did not mature as a military aerial reconnaissance
technology until the mid-1980s.
69This is primarily due to the extremely low thermal
expansion coefficient of silicon, the material from which the
semiconductor photo array is constructed.
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photographic material, and can function under low light
conditions .
3. compact, robust design; CCD sensors are significantly
smaller than aerial cameras 70 and are virtually
insensitive to external influences such as magnetic
fields and vibration. (Jahne, 1991, pp. 2-3)
Perhaps most importantly, CCD sensors collect imagery in
the form of digital signals. Because these digital signals are
electronically reconstructed to form the original image, CCD
sensors preclude the requirement for film processing . Digital
imagery may be stored on tape (as well as other media) until
completion of the reconnaissance mission, or can be
electronically transmitted to a ground station while the
mission is in progress . Furthermore, digital imagery can be
subjected to a wide range of manipulative and enhancement
7GThis advantage makes the CCD sensor attractive to
aircraft designers.
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techniques which may increase the effectiveness of the imagery
analyst. 71 Thus, the CCD has strong potential to overcome all
existing obstacles to timely and effective imagery support.
1. The Dissolution of VMFP-3
Issues pertaining to Marine tactical aerial
reconnaissance requirements and capabilities were discussed by
representatives from the intelligence, ground, and aviation
communities at the Tactical Aerial Reconnaissance Working
Group (TARWG) , a semi-annual meeting jointly convened by the
Intelligence and Aviation Divisions of Headquarters, U.S.
Marine Corps. 72
The TARWG provided an open forum for discussion of
perceived shortfalls, as well as proposed enhancements of the
Marine aerial reconnaissance capability. Continued criticism
of film-based systems, coupled with the availability of
71An example of such a technique is the "grey stretch."
The grey stretch function separates the grey shades on a
digital image (typically 256 different shades) into their
discrete electronic values, allows contrast adjustment between
these values, and consequently facilitates differentiation
between extremely subtle shades on the image. The grey stretch
often permits detection of objects which might not normally be
discernible to the human eye. For example, an oblique
photograph of an aircraft hangar might reveal only
impenetrable shadow inside the structure, whereas a similar
digital image, after a grey stretch, could separate a
previously invisible aircraft from the surrounding shadow.
72The aviation weapons section of the Aviation Division
(Code APW) was (and continues to be) responsible for the
articulating aerial reconnaissance aircraft and sensor
requirements. The author was a TARWG participant from 1985
through 1990.
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alternative technologies, made the development of a near-real-
time reconnaissance capability increasingly more prominent on
the TARWG agenda. By 1982, the Marine Corps had made a
conscious commitment to participate in the development of the
Advanced Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance System (ATARS) , a
CCD-based, "electro-optical " 7i system.
ATARS was widely heralded as the panacea sought by Marine
imagery intelligence consumers. The system promised high
quality, near-real-time imagery, without the logistical burden
imposed by cumbersome film processing systems. Additionally,
when the F/A-18D Hornet was designated as the ATARS
platform, 74 concerns about aircraft survivability quickly
waned.
The F/A-18D was to be a multi-mission aircraft, capable of
carrying weapons as well as reconnaissance sensors. When
configured for reconnaissance, the aircraft would not have an
air-to-air gun, since the ATARS sensors would replace the
cannon in the forward cockpit bay. However, the F/A-18D could
still be equipped with air-to-air missiles for self defense
and/or ordnance for ground attack. With such flexibility, the
7jAn electro-optical system combines the CCD focal plane
with optical lenses.




F/A-18D would mark the introduction of a well-armed, highly
survivable Marine reconnaissance aircraft, and the demise of
the "unarmed and unafraid" RF-4B. 75
A comprehensive exploitation system, the Joint Service
Imagery Processing System (JSIPS) was conceived to replace the
AN/TYQ-12 as the primary equipment of the FIIU. JSIPS would be
designed to receive imagery from the F/A-18D ATARS via a
digital data link; the system promised to facilitate the
immediate exploitation of imagery through the use of
"softcopy" (digital) workstations and the timely dissemination
of both reports and products via secondary imagery
dissemination systems (SIDS)
.
7b Together, ATARS and JSIPS
seemed to represent an optimal architecture for future Marine
imagery intelligence operations.
However, the push toward ATARS and JSIPS was largely based
upon some highly questionable paper studies, which neglected
to address significant technical issues, such as the
integration of divergent imaging, exploitation, and
communication technologies.
ATARS was born based on these studies, contractor
promises, and the promise of real time tactical
""Unarmed and unafraid" was the perennial motto of
reconnaissance pilots who flew poorly armed aircraft in the
face of danger.
76SIDS are high resolution digital imagery transmission
devices. The U.S. Navy's Fleet Imagery Support Terminal (FIST)
is an example of SIDS.
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reconnaissance. With the birth of ATARS, the death of
photographic reconnaissance was sounded, at least
officially. (Allen, 1990, p. 257)
By the mid-1980s, the Marine Corps had not only awarded
contracts for the development of ATARS and JSIPS, but had also
begun planning for the retirement of the RF-4B and the
dissolution of VMFP-3 . These two interrelated force structure
decisions immediately generated a measure of corporate inertia
which ultimately led to the complete demise of tactical aerial
reconnaissance within the Marine Corps for a significant
period of time.
The initial operating capability (IOC) of the F/A-18D ATARS
was originally scheduled to coincide with the demise of the
RF-4B; both systems were to be maintained in parallel, with a
gradual introduction of Hornet airframes and a simultaneous
incremental retirement of Phantoms, until the transition was
completed. However, several factors undermined execution of
this prudent strategy.
From a fiscal perspective, to justify procurement of the
multi-mission F/A-18D in an era of increasingly scarce fiscal
resources, the Marine Corps had to demonstrate economy in its
proposed aviation force structure. The F/A-18D was to fulfill
the mission of several aircraft (i.e. fighter, attack, all-
weather attack, reconnaissance) ; therefore, to ensure funding
of the new Hornet, the Corps needed to replace a larger number
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of "obsolete" aircraft with a smaller number of F/A-18DS. 7
This requirement was prerequisite to the acquisition of the
F/A-18D, and was driven by the military budgeting process of
the era. (Pittman, 1992)
Also, VMFP-3 was a relatively expensive squadron to
maintain, primarily due to its large number of support
personnel and the intensive maintenance requirements of its
aging aircraft. Continued operation of VMFP-3 until IOC of the
F/A-18D, and throughout the planned eighteen to twenty-four
month transition period, 7: began to appear less attractive
within the prevailing fiscal constraints, despite the
capability requirements for combat readiness .( Pittman, 1992)
From a perceptual viewpoint, Marine infantry battalions
were demanding more resources during this period, and the
Commandant of the Marine Corps 79 did not perceive maintenance
of the RF-4B to be as significant a requirement as the
immediate expansion and modernization of ground forces.
(Pittman, 1992)
770n 27 April 1992, the author interviewed Lieutenant
General Charles Pittman, USMC (ret), who was the Marine Corps
Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation during this period. LtGen.
Pittman stated: "to get the F/A-18D, a new aircraft, we had to
show that we were giving up more aircraft than we were
procuring." (Pittman, 1992)
78This period accounts for the training of aircrew and
support personnel
.
79General A.M. Gray was the Commandant during this period.
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Additionally, and perhaps most significantly, the Marine
Corps saw no major conflict looming on the horizon in which
tactical aerial reconnaissance would play a major role.
Therefore, when faced with the option of standing down an
operational A-6 Intruder (all-weather attack) squadron or
disbanding VMFP-3 early, the Marine Corps curiously chose to
relinquish its tactical aerial reconnaissance capability in
order to comply with the budgetary stipulations governing
procurement of the F/A-18D. 8( Plans to make a smooth
transition from the RF-4B to the F/A-18D were summarily
abandoned, as the dissolution of VMFP-3 was tentatively
scheduled for the end of fiscal year (FY) 1989 and F/A-18D
ATARS IOC was optimistically projected as FY 1992. (Pittman,
19 92) Thus, the phenomenon known as the "tac recce gap" was
born. Willingness to sanction such a capability gap was met
with significant resistance.
The Marine Corps intelligence community was the primary
source of adamant opposition to early retirement of the RF-4B.
During increasingly volatile TARWG sessions, intelligence
80This decision was indeed curious, because if Marine
force structure planners saw no conflict on the horizon, it
would arguably have been more appropriate to disband an
Intruder squadron (of which there are many) rather than the
RF-4B squadron (of which there was only one)
.
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officers from throughout the FMF warned of potentially-
devastating consequences if the Marine Corps were to be
committed to combat during the three-year tac recce gap.
To appease the concerns of the perceived doomsayers, in
1987 the Aviation Division proposed procurement of the
Expeditionary Tactical Aerial Reconnaissance System (ETARS)
,
a pod-mounted system for the AV-8B Harrier, as an interim
capability. However, it was quickly determined that the
requirements of budgeting, development, and flight testing
would preclude the delivery of ETARS within three to four
years. Therefore, because the system could not have diminished
the potentially negative impact of the tac recce gap, ETARS
was never seriously pursued further.
Meanwhile, the inevitable contractor delays caused
slippage in the development and production schedules for
ATARS, B1 and lengthened the period of the tac recce gap. By
1988, the projected IOC for ATARS was 1994. 82 It is
significant to note that although IOC for the ATARS sensors
was postponed, IOC for the F/A-18D airframe experienced
minimal, if any delays. Yet, without the ATARS sensors, the
F/A-18D could have no impact as a tactical aerial
reconnaissance platform.
81Similar delays affected the JSIPS program,
82JSIPS IOC was then projected at 1992.
By 1989, the ATARS program slipped again, and IOC was
postponed until FY 1995. In response to this delay, the
Aviation Division agreed to retain a skeleton capability of
eight RF-4Bs until July 1991. But this action proved to be no
more than a perfunctory gesture, for by April 1990, after
obtaining concurrence from the FMF commanders , the Aviation
Division scheduled retirement of the remaining VMFP-3 elements
for October 1990. 83 (see the Appendix for the complete text
of the VMFP-3 deactivation message)
.
Thus, a fiscally-driven, cosmetic approach to force
planning, a dilatory process of reconnaissance system
acquisition, and a low prioritization of tactical aerial
reconnaissance (among peacetime commanders) led to the
decision which allowed the complete demise of Marine aerial
reconnaissance during the now five-year tac recce gap. This
myopic decision was clearly an extension of the cyclical trend
which had governed the U.S. tactical aerial reconnaissance
8jLtGen. Pittman stated that the FMF commanders were
consulted and they subsequently concurred with a plan to
retire the remaining RF-4Bs. The VMFP-3 deactivation message
indicates that LtGen. Pittman discussed the issue with both
LtGen. Cook (then Commanding General , FMF Atlantic) and LtGen.
Milligan (then Commanding General, FMF Pacific) on 9 March
1990 (reference 'C and its amplification reflects this
conversation; see Appendix B) . Note that the actual
dissolution of the remaining VMFP-3 elements occurred on 10
August 1990.
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capability since the end of the First World War. For the
United States Marine Corps, it was a decision which would
produce almost instantaneous repercussions.
With the dissolution of VMFP-3, the Marine Corps gambled
that there would be no war or crisis which would require a
tactical aerial reconnaissance capability during the tac recce
gap; the Corps immediately lost its wager, and gained the
dubious distinction of being the only military organization to
have ever demobilized its tactical aerial reconnaissance
assets at the commencement of a major conflict.
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IV. THE PERSIAN GULF WAR
"Getting along without air photo coverage imposes
acute strain on a modern field force.
"
S.L.A. Marshall
(Marshall, 1950, p. 5)
"A serious shortfall the Marines faced was the absence
of a tactical aerial reconnaissance platform able to
provide imagery responsive to ground commanders'
requirements . The RF-4B, recently taken out of service,
had not yet been replaced by the reconnaissance pods
programmed for the F/A-18D"
(Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 1992, p.C-11)
At 0100 local time on 2 August 1990, three Iraqi
Republican Guard Forces Command (RGFC) divisions launched an
attack across the Kuwaiti border, as an incredulous community
of free nations looked on.
A mechanized infantry division and an armored division
conducted the main attack south into Kuwait along the
Safwan- ' Abdally axis, driving for the Al-Jahra pass.
Another armored division conducted a supporting attack
farther west. Almost simultaneously, at 0130, a special
operations force conducted the first attack on Kuwait City
- a heliborne assault against key government facilities.
Meanwhile, commando teams made amphibious assaults against
the Amir's palace and other key facilities....
The three attacking armored and mechanized formations,
supported by combat aircraft, linked up at Al-Jahra. The
two divisions conducting the main attack continued east to
Kuwait City, where they joined the special operations
forces by 0530. By 1900, Iraqi forces had secured the
city. Concurrently, the supporting armored division moved
south from Al-Jahra to establish blocking positions on the
main avenues of approach from the Saudi border....
On 4 August, Iraqi tanks were establishing defensive
positions. Hundreds of logistical vehicles were moving men
and massive quantities of munitions and supplies south.
RGFC infantry divisions that had been deployed to the
border area in late July moved into Kuwait, occupied
Kuwait City, and secured the primary lines of
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communication to and from southern Iraq. By this time,
more Iraqi divisions were moving south to Kuwait from
garrisons in Iraq. These forces would replace the RGFC
units in defensive positions in Kuwait. This replacement
was ominous for, while it allowed a possible return of
RGFC units to Iraq, it also freed these formations for a
subsequent attack into Saudi Arabia .... (Conduct of the
Persian Gulf War, 1992, pp. 1-2)
By 6 August, the Iraqis were conducting massive
consolidation and resupply operations throughout Kuwait; this
activity was widely interpreted as possible preparation for
continued advances to the south. At this time, the Iraqi force
in Kuwait was estimated to be at least eleven divisions
strong, with 200,000 men and 2,000 tanks. On the same day, the
President of the United States ordered the deployment of
American combat forces to Southwest Asia, and on 7 August
1990, Operation Desert Shield commenced.
A. OPERATION DESERT SHIELD
On 8 August, undaunted by growing international
condemnation, the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein publicly
announced the annexation of Kuwait; invoking historical and
cultural commonality, he labeled the overridden emirate as the
19th Province of Iraq. (Conduct of The Persian Gulf War, 1992,
pp. 44 -4 5)
Within the following week, 7th MEB had deployed from
Twentynine Palms, California to Al-Jubayl, Saudi Arabia as the
lead element of a force which would ultimately grow to two
MEFs . On 19 August, the main body of 3rd FIIU also arrived in
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Al-Jubayl as an element of Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and
Intelligence Support Group 7 (SRISG-7)
,
84
However, although the Marines of 3rd FIIU were combat
ready - they had arrived fully trained, with all available
equipment - the imagery analysts lacked even a nebulous
mission. In fact, the Marine imagery exploitation unit
received little, if any direction from the Brigade, because
between the peak of Iraq's blitz of Kuwait and the deployment
of the first Marine forces to Southwest Asia, a surreal yet
consequential event had transpired: on 10 August 1990, while
the bulk of I MEF donned desert camouflage in anticipation of
the first major war in over fifteen years, the MCAS El Toro
Band lent an ironic measure of pomp to the ceremony which
officially deactivated the remnants of VMFP-3.
As a result of the series of myopic decisions which
culminated in this event, "The Eyes of the Corps" were blinded
at precisely the time when they were most needed. The bitter
irony was that the forthcoming war in the Persian Gulf would
ultimately generate the heaviest demand for imagery
intelligence ever experienced in the history of the Marine
Corps
.
84The SRISG is a task-organized unit of intelligence and
related support capabilities which is deployed with Marine
Air/Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs)
.
93
During the initial stages of Operation Desert Shield, a
surprisingly cavalier attitude toward imagery intelligence
prevailed among the 7th MEB staff. Imagery analysts were
predominantly employed to fill sand bags and prepare
administrative correspondence during their first six v/eeks of
deployment. At one point, when a frustrated FIIU Commander
inquired about establishing an imagery-related mission for his
unit, the response he received was that "imagery just isn't a
priority." This observation was extremely short lived.
By late September, I MEF had arrived in Al-Jubayl, and had
been established as the component command for Marine Forces
U.S. Central Command (MARCENT) . MARCENT immediately began
planning for defensive and potential offensive operations in
its area of responsibility. However, even a cursory
examination of MARCENT' s available cartographic stocks quickly
revealed inaccuracies and gaps in the topographical map
coverage of northern and coastal Saudi Arabia. In lieu of
tactical aerial reconnaissance - the preferred method for
updating maps - the MARCENT intelligence staff proposed use of
the Marine remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) to obtain current
imagery coverage of areas of concern.
The Marine RPV, the Pioneer, was equipped with an electro-
optical imaging system which could downlink imagery in near-
real-time to a ground station. The Pioneer's imaging system
was not capable of standoff (i.e. long range oblique)
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collection; the RPV had to fly relatively close to the target
area to collect suitable imagery. However, even with direct
overflight of the target, the Pioneer collected imagery most
suitable for detection purposes, but not detailed exploitation
or terrain analysis. In the Marine Corps, the Pioneer was
predominantly employed for fire support coordination (i.e.
target acquisition, fire adjustment) purposes; its utility as
a viable imagery reconnaissance system was tenuous, at best.
Yet, the RPV represented MARCENT's singular organic source
for imagery collection of any type. Accordingly, permission to
conduct RPV reconnaissance flights in the Kuwaiti border areas
was requested from U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) . However,
CENTCOM refused to approve MARCENT's request for an
unanticipated reason: politics! The Pioneer contained parts
manufactured by an Israeli firm, and compromise of this fact
might have debilitated the fragile political-military
coalition which was being assembled to confront Iraq.
CENTCOM was concerned that a Marine RPV might malfunction
and crash in Kuwait, where Iraqi forces could conceivably
examine the aircraft and expose the origin of the Pioneer's
parts. Since there was scarce ideological cohesion between the
Islamic and western nations of the coalition at this early
stage, proof of Israeli complicity in western, especially
American, intervention conceivably could have enervated, if
not shattered the delicate alliance. Therefore, the Marine
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Corps was ironically prevented from employing its only imagery
collection asset throughout the five month period of Operation
Desert Shield.
The Kuwaiti border area remained an area of increasing
concern to MARCENT, because not only was it a region for which
current topographical data was lacking; national intelligence
sources indicated that it was also an area in which the Iraqi
forces were constructing their most concentrated network of
defenses and obstacles. And as the prospect of breaching the
Iraqi defenses in offensive operations became more real,
MARCENT became more desperate in its quest for imagery.
Furthermore, there was a marked paucity in the availability of
signals intelligence (SIGINT) and human intelligence (HUMINT)
in the theater of operations, but not due to any lack of
collection assets. The Iraqi forces were well cognizant of
American SIGINT capabilities; consequently, Iraqi units in
Kuwait exercised such painstaking discipline over electronic
and communications emissions that most of the technologically
sophisticated U.S. SIGINT capabilities were of marginal use in
monitoring Iraqi activity."" HUMINT collection, having been
85Proponents of SIGINT would undoubtedly argue that the
SIGINT assets indirectly accomplished a significant mission in
the Persian Gulf, since mere cognizance of their capability
precluded effective Iraqi command and control. This phenomenon
certainly cannot be discounted, but SIGINT was nevertheless
unable to help campaign planners who were concerned with
terrain features and obstacle construction.
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constrained by political concerns, was likewise of little
consequence. 86 Therefore, imagery represented virtually the
only source of current tactical intelligence the Kuwait
Theater of Operations (KTO) . At this point, The Marine Corps,
by now functionally lacking an organic capability to collect
any imagery, sought support from external sources. In the near
term, the U.S. Air Force seemed to be a potential savior.
The Air Force had activated a squadron of Air National
Guard RF-4Cs, and had deployed the reconnaissance aircraft to
Al Dhafra, United Arab Emirates in late August 1990. By early
September, these assets were conducting regular reconnaissance
missions near the Kuwaiti border. The RF-4Cs returned their
film to Al Dhafra for immediate processing, exploitation,
production, and dissemination. Within 48 hours after the
mission, the film was delivered to Air Forces, U.S. Central
Command (CENTAF) headquarters in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia 87 for
further exploitation and production. Upon learning of CENTAF'
s
8fcCENTCOM was unwilling to permit active HUMINT collection
(including deployment of Marine Force Reconnaissance assets)
to avoid the appearance of an aggressor during what was
perceived as a politically sensitive, formative period for the
coalition. It is significant to note that plans for potential
offensive operations against Iraqi forces were still
compartmented at this time.
87CENTAF headquarters was located in the Royal Saudi Air
Force (RSAF) headquarters building.
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capability, MARCENT dispatched the FIIU commander to Riyadh to
establish liaison with the CENTAF intelligence officer. 88
By early October, MARCENT and CENTAF had negotiated a
mutual support agreement, whereby in return for additional
exploitation support from 3rd FIIU, CENTAF would provide
imagery collection and production support to MARCENT. To this
end, 3rd FIIU relocated its main body to the RSAF headquarters
in Riyadh, and established a small detachment at Al Dhafra.
This mutually beneficial relationship immediately provided a
bittersweet revelation to MARCENT.
The Air National Guard RF-4Cs flew unobtrusive missions
fifteen miles south of the Kuwaiti border, but using their 60-
inch focal length cameras, Sy those Phantoms were able to
effectively image areas up to fifteen miles north of the
border. The RF-4Cs were thus able to acquire current, detailed
imagery coverage of the defensive belts with which MARCENT had
become especially concerned. However, MARCENT' s collection
requests were, understandably, not given priority over
CENTAF 's requirements, and MARCENT was prohibited from
directly tasking RF-4C missions. Most significantly, the
Marines suddenly realized that their recently retired RF-4Bs
88The author served as Commander, 3rd FIIU and Commander,
MARCENT FIIU for the entirety of Operations Desert Shield and
Desert Storm. CENTAF' s intelligence officer was Col. Christon,
USAF.
89The Air National Guard RF-4Cs used the KS-127 camera.
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could have provided an identical capability, and would have
been directly responsive to MARCENT's requirements.
In November 1990, MARCENT actually considered reactivation
of its reconnaissance Phantoms. However, the idea was
chimerical, for most of the last RF-4Bs had been cannibalized
and scattered; one of the aircraft had been mounted on a
concrete pedestal in front of a midwestern town hall. Still,
Marine ground and aviation commanders continued to levy
overwhelming requirements against a tenuous, if not
nonexistent capability.
Third FIIU's CENTAF detachments represented MARCENT' s only
source of current imagery throughout most of Operation Desert
Shield. As demand for imagery products continued to increase,
MARCENT deployed VMFP-3's ES-40A from MCAS El Toro, where it
had been awaiting transportation to the logistical depot, to
Riyadh as an organic production capability. But the ES-40A
alone was incapable of slaking the Marine commanders' thirst
for imagery products because without a dedicated collection
capability, timely and responsive coverage of MARCENT areas
could not be guaranteed.
In the closing weeks of Operation Desert Shield, MARCENT
looked toward a newly introduced imagery intelligence
capability, the Joint Imagery Production Complex (JIPC) , for
support. The JIPC had been established in late December 1990
as a reception, exploitation, and production site for national
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imagery. Located at Riyadh Air Base, the JIPC was an expansive
facility, and was operated by a joint/combined staff. 9( By
early January 1991, 3rd FIIU had been augmented by 2nd FIIU,
and the composite organization was designated the MARCENT
FIIU. With these increased personnel assets, MARCENT
established a sizeable FIIU detachment at the JIPC. Later,
through coordination with the U.S. Navy, CENTCOM had an ES-40A
delivered from Naval Air Station Cubi Point, Republic of the
Philippines, to the JIPC for MARCENT' s use.
Although establishment of the JIPC was a milestone in the
Persian Gulf War, as well as in the history of American
military intelligence, 91 it did little to alleviate the
perceived shortage of imagery intelligence among Marine
commanders. The JIPC produced high-quality, large-format
imagery products for MARCENT in volume on numerous occasions;
yet due to the competing priorities which governed the tasking
of national systems, the JIPC could not guarantee complete and
timely coverage of MARCENT' s areas of interest.
The national imagery collection systems from which the
JIPC derived its imagery were heavily tasked by CENTCOM and
90The JIPC Director was Col. R.H. Clegg, USA. The JIPC was
staffed by personnel from the U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps,
U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, RAF, British Army, Canadian Air
Force, Australian Army, and Washington D.C. -based civilians.
91The JIPC represented the first time a capability of its
sort had ever been deployed in a theater of combat
.
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its components, but these systems were accessible in theater
for only a limited amount of time during each 24-hour period.
Furthermore, the national systems were extensively employed
for indications and warnings (I&W) purposes by Washington D.C.
area consumers. Therefore, because national imagery collection
missions were neither consistently (or even frequently)
prioritized in MARCENT's favor, nor constantly in view of
MARCENT's operating area, Marine commanders could not
completely rely upon the JIPC for timely and responsive
support
.
Thus, although MARCENT belatedly gained access to two
external sources of imagery, neither CENTAF nor the JIPC was
primarily dedicated to support of MARCENT and consequently,
neither organization could satiate the demand for imagery
among Marine commanders. Only an organic aerial reconnaissance
capability, directly tasked and controlled by MARCENT, could
have alleviated the imagery shortfalls in Southwest Asia. This
already acute problem was only further exacerbated by the
initiation of combat operations.
B. OPERATION DESERT STORM
The Desert Storm strategic air campaign was specifically
directed toward destruction of Iraqi command, control, and
communications (C3) facilities, and military/industrial
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production capabilities while minimizing collateral damage. 92
To accomplish these goals, CENTAF precision strike missions
were heavily reliant upon detailed targeting.
Throughout the strategic air campaign, imagery was the
unitary source of intelligence upon which detailed targeting
was based to support the delivery of precision munitions.
While national imagery systems provided effective support for
deliberate targeting, only tactical aerial reconnaissance
systems provided the responsiveness prerequisite to reactive
and immediate restrike targeting. Although CENTAF and the JIPC
made every effort to satisfy the imagery requirements for
MARCENT strike operations, the Marine aviation assets were
unable to directly task imagery collection assets, and
consequently lacked optimal support.
During the Desert Storm tactical air campaign, targeting
was even more heavily dependent upon tactical aerial
reconnaissance. The dynamic tactical environment demanded
immediate pre- and post-strike reconnaissance to support
effective target acquisition and restrike determinations. RPVs
lacked the speed and range for such missions, while national
systems lacked the responsiveness; only tactical aerial
92Collateral damage limitation was sought for its
political utility. Note that throughout Operation Desert
Storm, President Bush used the media to declare that he had
"no argument with the Iraqi people." Collateral damage
limitation lends credibility to such a policy and minimizes
the negative political impact of enemy propaganda.
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reconnaissance assets were proven suitable to support the
requirements generated during the tactical air campaign.
Lacking its own capability, MARCENT was forced to rely upon
less responsive external aerial reconnaissance support during
the tactical air campaign.
Tactical aerial reconnaissance also played a pivotal
political role, as it provided conclusive evidence of Iraqi
ecoterrorism in the Persian Gulf, y and delivered proof of
the coalition's collateral damage limitation policy.
Finally, in the Desert Storm ground campaign--the
culmination of coalition operations in Southwest Asia--MARCENT
operated in a similar environment of voluminous imagery
requirements, but with a limited capability. Having been
tasked with the mission of attacking through the highly
developed Iraqi obstacles and defenses in southern Kuwait,
MARCENT was faced with a particularly pressing need for
responsive imagery support.
The defensive belt, which had by then become popularly (or
unpopularly, depending upon one's geographic location) known
as "the wall of death, " was a complex and formidable system of
interlocking barriers designed to impede and attrite the
attacking coalition forces. "The wall of death" included
93Tactical aerial reconnaissance assets imaged leaking
off-shore oil terminals which had been intentionally damaged
by Iraqi forces.
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extensive infantry trenches, revetted armor positions, barbed
wire, fences, minefields, and "incendiary trenches." 94
Because it was widely believed that any Iraqi employment
of chemical weapons would most likely occur while coalition
ground forces were caught in "the wall of death," the specter
of massive casualties loomed over the forthcoming Marine
ground assault. At the same time, dichotomous domestic
political pressure was demanding the minimization of friendly
casualties during the ground war. Therefore, to succeed within
the prevailing military and political constraints, MARCENT
took painstaking efforts to ensure a swift breaching
operation
.
Implicit in these efforts was the requirement to provide
Marine combat engineers with highly detailed and current
intelligence concerning the exact dimensions, linear sequence,
and spatial separation of Iraqi obstacles; it was self-evident
that such information could only be derived from imagery.
Accordingly, MARCENT submitted a significant volume of
imagery requirements to CENTAF, the JIPC, and national
intelligence agencies in preparation for the ground campaign.
94The incendiary trenches were interlocking systems of
one-kilometer-long trenches, each of which had been connected
to a petroleum source (one pumping station had been
constructed to serve each group of ten trenches) . These unique
oil-filled obstacles were to be set ablaze in front of the




While each of these organizations supported the Marine
requirements with a varying degree of responsiveness, the
aggregate effort yielded scarcely usable results, for the
uncoordinated coverage and analysis of "the wall of death"
produced largely contradictory intelligence.
No single agency was able to collect and analyze synoptic
coverage of the target area; 95 and therefore, MARCENT
sequentially received reports and products from multiple
organizations. The total effort resulted in a significant
degree of confusion, because as Marine analysts plotted each
agency's slightly different mensural and locational data for
individual obstacles, an extremely inaccurate and muddled
picture of southern Kuwait emerged.
MARCENT ultimately appealed to a national intelligence
agency for adjudication of the inconclusive imagery
intelligence, but did not acquire an authoritative analysis of
"the wall of death" until within one week of the ground
campaign, and then only by dispatching two officers from the
theater of operations to Washington, D.C. 9b Nevertheless, the
9S It is significant to note that national systems were
technologically incapable of providing such support, while
CENTAF RF-4Cs, although capable, could not be exclusively
dedicated to such a monumental effort and still fulfill Air
Force support requirements.
96The two officers were Captain Donahue and Captain
Rizzio, intelligence collection officers from First Marine
Division and Second Marine Division, respectively.
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Marine combat engineer platoons never received copies of the
elusive imagery products which depicted the obstacle belts.
There were simply not enough prints to go around. 9
Ironically, the Marine RF-4B could easily have provided
synoptic panoramic coverage of the Iraqi defenses in Kuwait,
had the aircraft been available. 98 Furthermore, an organic
tactical reconnaissance capability, coupled with the available
Marine exploitation and production assets, would clearly have
circumvented the confusion which plagued Marine imagery
intelligence during the Desert Storm ground campaign.
C. LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE
Imagery shortfalls during Operations Desert Shield and
Desert Storm prompted a demand among Marine commanders for the
reconstitution of an organic tactical aerial reconnaissance
capability. Lieutenant General Walter E. Boomer, Commanding
General of MARCENT during operations in Southwest Asia, noted:
In terms of intelligence, we probably have put too
many eggs in the satellite basket. In a campaign the size
of Desert Storm, the satellites get overworked and fail to
meet the expectations of the commanders, especially at
lower levels. We've led them to believe that they're going
to get some marvelous stuff--and what they do get is
pretty good--but it never quite measures up to their
expectations, and they want to know why....
97This problem was also the result of the sluggish Marine
intelligence dissemination capability, a phenomenon to which
an entire thesis could be dedicated.




We desperately missed the tactical reconnaissance
capability that the RF-4B, which left the inventory just
as this campaign started, would have provided. It's got to
be one of our top priorities to get that capability back
into the Corps. We simply can't place total reliance on
satellites for real-time surveillance, battle-damage
assessment, and the like. (Boomer, 1991, p. 50)"
Likewise, in his comments before the U.S. Senate, Major
General James M. Myatt, Commanding General of the First Marine
Division during operations in Southwest Asia, observed that
national systems were incapable of adequately supporting
Marine requirements, especially during the ground
campaign. 100 He also cited the vulnerability of RPVs in
contrast to high-speed, stand-off capable tactical aerial
reconnaissance platforms. Major General Myatt emerged as a
strong proponent for the reestablishment of a Marine tactical
aerial reconnaissance capability.
Thus, immediately following the Persian Gulf War, it
appeared that the Marine Corps had largely acknowledged the
vital role of aerial reconnaissance, and through recognition
"When interviewed by the author on 24 April 1992,
Lieutenant General Boomer noted that "Tactical aerial
reconnaissance is an absolutely vital capability. It was the
missing link in Southwest Asia, a capability gap for which we
paid a price... The low priority accorded to tactical aerial
reconnaissance is a recurring problem over history. No one
wants to pay attention to the capability until wartime."
(Boomer, 1992)
100Regarding national systems, Major General Myatt noted
that "There are only so many systems, and they have to meet
the priorities of the Nation." (U.S. Senate, 1991, p. 89)
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of this clear and present requirement, had resolved to
maintain a viable capability from then on.
However, the paucity of essential imagery intelligence
support during MARCENT ground operations also propagated a
rash of well-founded, but woefully misplaced criticism which
threatened to mitigate the post-war crusade. One high-ranking
observer noted:
The weakest area I observed was intelligence ... I had
the sense many of the problems are endemic and stem from
the way we select, train, and educate our intelligence
personnel. We fail to establish an operational mindset in
too many of the officers . To sum up my case, from October
1990 through January 1991, the 1st Marine Division tried
without success to obtain quality imagery of breach sites
through the intelligence system... In the meantime, I
examined first-class aerial photos obtained by the U.S.
Army and the British forces for their units on an early
and continuing basis. (Van Riper, 1991, p. 4)
This implicit indictment of the Marine Corps intelligence
establishment was reinforced by numerous charges of
"intelligence failure," which proliferated throughout the
Marine Corps; the allegations eventually appeared in media
sources as well.
Yet, the Marine intelligence community was strongly
opposed to the "tac recce gap" from its conception (as noted
earlier) , and at times represented the only organized source
of solid opposition to the myopic policy. Furthermore, FMF
intelligence officers attempted to formally dissuade early
dissolution of VMFP-3 at every possible opportunity.
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In contrast, ground commanders did not support continued
maintenance of VMFP-3 . As discussed earlier, prior to
scheduling retirement of the remaining RF-4Bs, the Aviation
Branch solicited contrary input from FMF commanders. But the
operational commanders did not consider tactical aerial
reconnaissance to be of such importance that it should be
allowed to encroach upon funds appropriated for ground
programs, and therefore did not support continued maintenance
of the capability. The Marine Corps intelligence community
could not possibly have influenced the situation any more than
it did. (Pittman, 1992)
Thus, a perceptual failure in the Marine Corps command
structure, similar to that which discounted the significance
of aerial reconnaissance subsequent to every major conflict
since World War I, precluded the availability of responsive
tactical aerial reconnaissance support for the Marine Corps at
the outset of Operation Desert Shield. Perhaps the ultimate
irony lies in the fact that some of the same officers who had
explicitly supported the early dissolution of VMFP-3 were
among those who were quick to condemn the imagery intelligence
deficiency in Southwest Asia. (Pitmann, 1992)
The Marine intelligence community is admittedly
responsible for a variety of issues; however, the demise of
tactical aerial reconnaissance cannot be counted among these
issues. In this instance, the "intelligence failure" label
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threatens to confine the aerial reconnaissance issue to a
specific functional area, and consequently discount the
systemic issue of command emphasis which is at the root of the
problem.
The onus of "intelligence failure" in this incident must
thus be recognized as misleading, inappropriate, and
counterproductive. It is the overall command structure which
bears the incumbent responsibility for maintaining a viable
force composition. This responsibility holds in the past as
well as in the future.
Labeling the debacle of Marine aerial reconnaissance as an
"intelligence failure" tends to connote the existence of this
phenomenon within the exclusive purview of intelligence
officers, and presents the risk of diverting or concealing the
issue from the mainstream of fiscal and doctrinal concerns. To
thus denigrate such a proven, vital capability this process is
both deceptive and dangerous. Accordingly, it is paramount
that the systemic nature of tactical aerial reconnaissance be
fully recognized to preclude the emergence of similar
capability gaps in the future.
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V. FUTURE CAPABILITIES
"I just think there is now a void in the intelligence
system because we focus too much on what might be called
'national systems, ' which respond more to national
directive out of Washington."
General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USA
(U.S. Senate, 1991, pp. 320-321)
"RPVs have a role, but I think RPVs in some cases are
vulnerable. We need the RPV capability, but we also need
the fast-moving tactical aerial reconnaissance
capabi lity . "
Major General James M. Myatt, USMC
(U.S. Senate, 1991, p. 89)
A viable imagery intelligence architecture must, above
all, be based upon an effective collection capability. In the
current and projected combat environments, the tactical
effectiveness of an imagery collection capability is measured
in terms of several variables, including its ability to:
1. collect high-quality imagery
2. respond to the commanders' requirements
3. provide timely results
4. conduct non-provocative missions
5. operate effectively within the threat environment
It is evident that these measures of effectiveness will
undoubtedly be of increasing importance on the dynamic,
politically constrained battlefields of the future; it is
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likewise evident that neither national systems nor RPVs will,




The United States maintains a highly sophisticated
constellation of national imagery collection systems which are
indisputably capable of collecting high-quality imagery,
conducting non-provocative missions, and surviving the threat.
However, U.S. national imagery systems were conceived,
designed, and deployed for two primary purposes: strategic I&W
and arms control verification.
Current "tactical exploitation of national systems"
(TENCAP) doctrine evolved as an adjunct mission of national
systems, in order to broaden--but not alter--their range of
application. Therefore, even when heavily tasked by combat
essential TENCAP requirements, national systems will remain
primarily dedicated to the strategic mission, and cannot be
relied upon for responsive, timely tactical support.
Furthermore, although the physical laws which govern the
flight of national systems facilitate predictable platform
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availability, they also preclude the immediate or "on-call"
availability which is so vital in a fluid tactical
environment . 101
This is not to say that national systems are of no use to
the tactical commander. National imagery systems are
admittedly useful in operational planning where time is not a
dominant consideration, and especially where non-provocative
coverage of denied areas is required. But in combat, where
imagery frequently performs a decisive role, national systems
lack the requisite responsiveness and timeliness to be
tactically effective.
B. REMOTELY PILOTED VEHICLES AND UNMANNED AIR VEHICLES
Significant emphasis has recently been placed upon the
development of RPVs as aerial reconnaissance platforms. RPVs,
also known as unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), provide a major
advantage in their ability to collect near-real-time imagery
through the employment of compact EO sensors and relay
systems
.
However, current and planned RPV/UAV platform designs are
significantly constrained by size and weight, and therefore
101Brookes notes "It is in the tactical environment
that the manned PR (photo reconnaissance) aircraft scores
over the satellite. Time is usually at a premium in
scenarios such as Vietnam, as it would be if the divisions
of the (former) Warsaw Pact marched on the Rhine, and
space vehicles are very demanding of time." (p. 231)
113
cannot accommodate long focal length (i.e. 60-inch+)
reconnaissance systems. Consequently, RPVs and UAVs remain
functionally incapable of collecting high-quality imagery
during high-altitude missions and not suitable for conducting
non-provocative stand-off reconnaissance missions. 102
Due to their relatively slow speed, restricted altitude,
and limited maneuverability, RPVs and UAVs are also somewhat
vulnerable to enemy air defenses, and unsuitable for many
post-strike reconnaissance requirements.
RPVs and UAVs are highly effective for surveillance and
detection applications, especially in low or medium threat
environments, but they cannot serve as substitutes for
tactical aerial reconnaissance.
C. TACTICAL AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE PLATFORMS
Of the available imagery collection capabilities, only
tactical aerial reconnaissance platforms can satisfy all the
requirements for effectiveness. Multisensor imagery
reconnaissance aircraft can collect high-quality imagery
during low-altitude, high-speed missions, as well as during
non-provocative standoff missions.
With the development of highly effective electronic
countermeasures (ECM) equipment and suppression of enemy air
102This limitation is due to the requirement for
overflight of the target area.
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defense (SEAD) doctrine, tactical aerial reconnaissance
platforms have become extremely survivable in restrictive
threat environments.
Forthcoming reconnaissance aircraft equipped with digital
sensors will provide a high-quality near-real-time capability
which will surmount the limitations of the RPV/UAV and
national capabilities alike.
Considering these capabilities it is perhaps most
significant to note that tactical aerial reconnaissance
platforms provide an unparalleled level of responsiveness to
the tactical commander. The range and speed of current
reconnaissance aircraft, coupled with their "on-call"
availability to the tactical commander, make these assets the
optimal source for tactical imagery support.
Likewise, during pre- and post -combat operations, tactical
reconnaissance platforms offer a timely and effective means of
monitoring enemy activity in a non-provocative manner. Their
stand-off capability is both militarily and politically
indispensable, as it facilitates reactive planning and
ceasefire compliance verification without threatening
escalation
.
The inherent capabilities of national imagery systems,
RPVs/UAVs, and tactical reconnaissance platforms can
ostensibly appear to be considered complimentary; in fact,
this is true to a degree. Yet, it must be recognized that in
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the absence of national systems and RPVs/UAVs, tactical aerial
reconnaissance platforms can still provide the tactical
commander with timely and effective imagery support. The
converse is not true for either national systems or RPVs/UAVs.
Imagery intelligence is a truly enabling function of combat,
and aerial reconnaissance is the sine qua non of tactical
imagery intelligence.
D. THE ADVANCED TACTICAL AIR RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEM
The F/A-18D ATARS promises to provide the Marine Corps with
a viable aerial reconnaissance capability, unsurpassed in
timeliness and responsiveness. The digitally downlinked ATARS
sensors will effectively eliminate the time required for the
aircraft's return to base, film downloading, and film
processing (refer to Table 4, page 77) . In conjunction with
ATARS, the SIDS resident within JSIPS will eliminate the time
required for report transmission, film printing, and product
delivery. Conceptually, the ATARS-based imagery intelligence
architecture should provide the tactical imagery consumer with
high-quality products within minutes of the reconnaissance
mission's completion.
Perhaps most importantly, ATARS will be an organic system
directly responsive to the Marine commanders. With the advent
of ATARS, Marine imagery requirements will not be constrained
by the prioritization policies of external organizations, as
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they had been in the Persian Gulf War; the "eyes of the Corps"
will be able to see again.
Yet, amidst this optimistic vision of a viable tactical
aerial reconnaissance capability, the legacy of myopia
prevails: ATARS IOC will still be delayed until 1995, and in
the event of another major crisis or conflict occurring during
the remainder of the "tac recce gap, " the Marine Corps will
again be completely dependent upon external imagery
intelligence support.
The United States Marine Corps is still paying for a wager
it lost in August, 1990.
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VI. CONCLUSION
"If we choose wisely today, we can do well something
America has always done badly before--we can draw down our
military force at a responsible rate that will not end up
endangering our security . We did not do this well after
World War II, and we found ourselves unprepared for the
Korean War barely five years later. We did not draw down
intelligently after Vietnam, and we found ourselves with
the hollow forces of the late '70s. We are determined to
avoid repeating these costly errors.
The Honorable Mr. Dick Cheney,
U.S. Secretary of Defense
(U.S. Department of Defense, 1992, p.xxvii)
"Qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum--he who desires
peace, prepares for war.
"
Vegetius
(Brookes, 1975, p. 219)
The development of a viable tactical aerial reconnaissance
capability within the U.S. military has clearly been
characterized by a myopic trend. Since its debut with American
forces in World War I, tactical aerial reconnaissance has
fulfilled an increasingly vital role. Yet, despite its
enabling attributes, the capability has been plagued by
peacetime neglect following every major conflict.
In the past, the pursuit of accelerated development
programs during protracted conflicts has compensated for this
endemic myopia, and has permitted a reactive reconstitution of
languid peacetime aerial reconnaissance capabilities. However,
future conflicts may not accommodate such reactive force
structure policies. In fact, after having completely dissolved
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its aerial reconnaissance assets immediately prior to a swift,
but major war, the U.S. Marine Corps was recently denied the
luxury of time for reconstitution of its capability, and was
consequently subjected to the full deleterious effect of its
shortsightedness
.
During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the
Marine Corps was harshly reacquainted with the fundamental
requirement to maintain a viable tactical aerial
reconnaissance capability. Immediately following combat
operations, many Marine commanders demanded reestablishment of
organic tac recce. However, by popularly labeling the demise
of Marine aerial reconnaissance as an "intelligence failure,"
the counterproductive cacophony of observers has tacitly
diverted attention from the systemic deficiencies of command
emphasis which ultimately precluded the availability of
responsive imagery intelligence support in Southwest Asia.
Thus, potential exists for reversion to the very same fiscal
and doctrinal neglect which has governed the development of
tactical aerial reconnaissance for most of this century. At
any rate, the legacy of previous myopia threatens to haunt the
Marine Corps, for the Corps must still survive a three-year
tac recce gap prior to the planned IOC of ATARS in 1995.
Although it was militarily anomalous, owing to its five-
month preparatory period, Operation Desert Storm was
paradigmatic of future conflicts in several respects. At the
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operational level, the Gulf War firmly established tactical
aerial reconnaissance as the future paragon of tactical
imagery support, through the juxtaposition of the relative
capabilities of all available imagery sources in a combat
environment for the first time. Those possessing organic
assets found that aerial reconnaissance surpassed the
effectiveness of both national systems and RPVs in providing
timely and responsive imagery intelligence support to their
parent organizations.
From an international political perspective, Desert Storm
ushered the arrival of close political oversight, demanding
the judicious application of combat power, which promises to
dominate the phenomenon of coalition warfare in the emerging
world order. Combat operations in Southwest Asia were clearly
governed by issues such as non-provocative crisis monitoring
and strict collateral damage limitation; such issues may have
superseded the importance of unbridled use of force in
military doctrine... perhaps irreversibly. 103
103The Hon. Mr. Les Aspin, Chairman of the House Armed
Services Committee, recently noted that "Operation Desert
Storm revealed significant problems in intelligence
support. Tactical intelligence, in particular, quickly
proved to be a serious flaw in the support chain... The
greater degree of interdependence between combat and
support suggests the need for a revised method of
evaluating service priorities. What has emerged as an
important lesson from Operation Desert Storm is that
acquiring support systems consistent with high-tech
weapons may be more important than buying the next
generation plane or tank." (see U.S. House, pp. 36-38)
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Finally, from the domestic political perspective, Desert
Storm set a somewhat burdensome perceptual precedent among the
American people. In fulfilling domestic demand for a swift
war, the U.S. military forces unwittingly cultivated the
popular perception that overwhelming victory may be achieved
with relatively few casualties. Consequently, the American
Armed Forces may henceforth be charged with the subtle, but
powerful, obligation to conduct only swift and relatively
bloodless wars.
As an inevitable military and political paradigm of future
conflicts, Operation Desert Storm prescribes the consistent
maintenance of a viable tactical aerial reconnaissance
capability among the U.S. Armed Forces. Only aerial
reconnaissance can ensure timely and responsive support of:
non-provocative imagery collection escalation control,
effective planning for ground operations, precision targeting
for collateral damage limitation, prompt coverage for BDA, and
post-war monitoring for ceasefire compliance verification.
Ultimately, a viable tactical aerial reconnaissance capability
facilitates both the judicious application of power and the
conservation of human lives. Therefore, the capability is
prerequisite to the fulfillment of both the projected military
and political requirements of future war. But forthcoming
conflicts may conceivably require U.S. Forces to fight upon
arrival; furthermore, future conflicts may not allow time to
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reconstitute demobilized assets. In this context, a languid
tactical aerial reconnaissance capability would clearly
present a serious liability.
The current era of fiscal austerity demands that planners
carefully choose to preserve essential capabilities in the
U.S. military force structure, and avoid the pitfalls of
misprioritization which threaten combat readiness.
To this end, the U.S. Marine Corps must escape the myopic
trend which recently precluded the availability of an organic
aerial reconnaissance capability during crisis and combat.
Recognition of previous dysfunctional command priorities, and
abandonment of the inaccurate, counterproductive "intelligence
failure" label are central to the resolution of this problem.
On the issue of Marine imagery intelligence deficiencies
during Operation Desert Storm, one observer noted that the
problem stemmed from the Marine Corps' failure establish an
operational mindset in its intelligence officers (Van Riper,
1991, p. 4) . Given the circumstances surrounding the debacle of
VMFP-3, this observation begs the issue. Current and future
warfare requirements mandate a rebalancing of the
"traditional" combat to combat support ratio to reflect
greater emphasis on key support elements such as tac recce.
In the near term, the Corps will continue to pay for its
myopic gamble. To prevent the resurgence of this particular
problem in the long term, it may be prudent for the Marine
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Corps to strive toward the establishment of an intelligence-
oriented mindset in its command structure
.
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APPENDIX. VMFP-3 DEACTIVATION MESSAGE
R 040001Z APR 90
FM CMC WASHINGTON DC/ /A//
TO CNO WASHINGTON DC//OP-05//
CG FMFLANT
CGFMFPAC













REF/C/CON/DCS AVN/ 09MAR9 /
/
AMPN/BETWEEN LTGEN PITMAN DCS AVN, LTGEN COOK FMFLANT, LTGEN
MILLIGAN FMFPAC//
RMKS/
1. REF A IS THE MARINE AVIATION PLAN (AVPLAN) FOR FY 89-90
2. REF B MODIFIED REF A TO RETIRE THE REMAINING RF-4B'S IN
VMFP-3 BY JUL 91
.
3. AS DISCUSSED AT REF C, THE COSTS OF RETAINING RF-4B'S HAVE
BECOME PROHIBITIVE IN THE CURRENT BUDGETARY ENVIRONMENT.
4. ACCORDINGLY, CMC (CODE ASL) WILL INITIATE ACTION TO
TRANSFER THE REMAINING EIGHT RF-4B'S FROM VMFP-3 NO LATER THAN
OCT 90. MMOA/MMEA WILL EFFECT ANY PERSONNEL TRANSFERS
NECESSARY THROUGH THE NORMAL STAFFING PROCESS.
5. REQUEST CG FMFPAC DEVELOP A POA&M TO DEACTIVATE VMFP-3.
6. VMFP-3 HAS PROVIDED SUPERB SUPPORT THROUGHOUT THE HISTORY
OF THE SQUADRON, BUT DEACTIVATION HAS BECOME AN UNAVOIDABLE
ECONOMIC NECESSITY.
7. HQMC POC: MAJ P.F. SHUTLER (APP-31), AUTOVON 224-2189,
LTCOL A.H. RICHARDSON (ASL-33), AUTOVON 224-1328.//
124
LIST OF REFERENCES
Allen, Phillip G. ; "Changing Reconnaissance Requirements,"
Proceedings of the International Society for Optical
Engineering : Airborne Reconnaissance XIV, v. 1342, pp. 256-260,
1990.
Babington-Smith, Constance, Air Spy: The Story of Photo
Intelligence in World War II, New York: Harper & Brothers,
1957.
Benford, Timothy B., The World War II Quiz and Fact Book, v. 2,
New York: Harper & Row, 1984.
Boomer, LtGen. Walter E., USMC, "Special Trust and Confidence
Among the Trail-Breakers," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,
November 1991, p. 50.
.
Telephone interview by author, 24 April 1992.
Boyne, Walter J., Phantom in Combat, Washington, D.C.:
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1985.
Brookes, Andrew J., Photo Reconnaissance, London: Ian Allen
Ltd., 1975.
Burrows, William E., Deep Black: Space Espionage and National
Security, New York: Random House, 1986.
Fagan, Lieutenant Colonel Michael, USMC, UNCLASSIFIED Letter
to the author, Subject: VMFP-3 Squadron History and
Deactivation (U) , 13 April 1992.
Fulbright, Major Barry D., USAF, "Considerations for Improving
Tactical Reconnaissance - The Eyes of the Combat Commander,
"
Monograph, U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort
Leavenwoth, KS, 1987.
Goddard, Brigadier General George W., USAF (ret), Overview: A
Lifelong Adventure in Aerial Photography, New York: Doubleday
& Company, Inc., 19 69.
Hallion, Richard P., The Naval Air War in Korea, Baltimore:
The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1986.
Heiman, Grover, Aerial Photography : The Story of Aerial
Mapping and Reconnaissance, New York: The Macmillan Company,
1972.
125
Hinsley, Frances H., British Intelligence in the Second World
War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations, v.l, London:
Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1979.
Infield, Glenn B., Unarmed and Unafraid, New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1970.
Jahne, Bernd, Digital Image Processing: Concepts, Algorithms
and Scientific Applications , New York: Springer-Verlag, 1991.
Jensen, Niels, Optical and Photographic Reconnaissance
Systems, New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1968.
Marshall, Samuel L.A., The River and the Gauntlet : Defeat of
the Eighth Army by the Chinese Communist Forces, November,
1950, in the Battle of the Chongchon River, Korea, New York:
William Morrow & Co
.
, 1953.
McDonnell-Douglas Corporation, Reconnaissance Handybook for
the Reconnaissance Specialist , St. Louis: McDonnell-Douglas,
1983.
Mersky, Peter B., U.S. Marine Corps Aviation: 1912 to the
Present, Baltimore: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company
of America, 1981.
Mersky, Peter B. and Norman Polmar, The Naval Air War in
Vietnam, Annapolis: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing
Company of America, 1981.
Montgomery, Dennis W., "Advanced Tactical Air Reconnaissance
System, " Proceedings of the International Society for Optical
Engineering : Airborne Reconnaissance V, v. 309, pp. 9-12, 1981.
Pitmann, LtGen. Charles, USMC (ret). Interview by author, 27
April 1992, Crystal City, VA. Tape recording.
Rodgers, A.L., and others, Surveillance and Target Acquisition
Systems, London: Brassey's Publishers Ltd., 1983.
Sherrod, Robert Lee, History of Marine Corps Aviation in World
War II, San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1980.
Stanley, Col. Roy M., USAF (ret), World War II Photo
Intelligence, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1981.
Taylor, John W.R., ed . , Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1969-
1970, London: Sampson Low Marston & Co. Ltd., 1969.
126
Taylor, John W.R. and Kenneth Munson, eds . Jane's All the
World's Aircraft 1978-1979
,
New York: Franklin Watts Inc.,
1978.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services, Defense for
a New Era: Lessons of the Persian Gulf War, Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1992.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services, Operation
Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. , 20 June
1991.
U.S. Department Of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War:
Final Report to Congress, Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1992.
U.S. Marine Corps, Fleet Marine Force Manual 5-6: Air
Reconnaissance, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1979.
Van Riper, BGen. Paul K., USMC, "Observations Made During
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, " memorandum to
LtGen. Cook, USMC, 9 March 1991.




Abel, Elie, The Missile Crisis, Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott
Co., 1966.
Armstrong, LtCol . Charles L, USMC (ret), "Surviving the Storm:
Will We Learn the Right Lessons from the Gulf War?," Marine
Corps Gazette, March 1992, p. 41.
Avery, Thomas Eugene, Interpretation of Aerial Photography,
Minneapolis: Burgess Publishing Company, 1962.
Baker, Wilfred H., The Elements of Photogrammetry, New York:
The Ronald Press Co., 1960.
Cagle, Malcolm W., and Frank A. Manson, The Sea War in Korea,
Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1957.
Carroll, John M., Secrets of Electronic Espionage, New York:
E. P. Dutton & Co. , 1966
.
Chamier, V.A., The Birth of the Royal Air Force, London:
Pitman Publishing Corporation, 1943.
Clagett, John, The U.S. Navy in Action, New York: Monarch
Books, 1963.
Dutton, Lyn, and others, Military Space, London: Brassey's
Inc., 1990.
Futrell, Robert F., The United States Air Force in Korea
1950-53, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983.
Gernsheim, Helmut, The History of Photography from the
Earliest Use of the Camera Obscura to the Beginning of the
Modern Era, New York: McGraw-Hill, 19 69.
Glines, C.V., ed., Lighter-Than-Air Flight , New York: Franklin
Watts, 1965.
Green, William, Famous Fighters of the Second World War, New
York: Hanover House, 1958.
Josephy, Alvin M., Jr., American Heritage History of Flight,
New York: American Heritage Publishing Co., 1962.
McTernan, LtCol . Walter F., Ill, USMC, "Intelligence: You Get
What You Pay For," Marine Corps Gazette, March 1992, p. 23.
128
Morgan, William, ed., The Complete Photographer, Washington,
D.C.: National Educational Alliance, Inc., 1942.
Newhall, Beaumont, The History of Photography from 1839 to the
Present Day, Boston: Museum Of Modern Art, 1969.
., Airborne Camera, Mamaroneck, NY: Hastings House,
1969.
Porter, Harold Everett, Aerial Observation, New York: Harper
& Row, 1921.
Reynolds, Quentin, They Fought for the Sky, New York: Holt,
Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1957.
Schowengerdt , Robert A., Techniques for Image Processing and
Classification in Remote Sensing, San Diego: Academic Press
Inc., 1983.
Smith, S.E., The United States Navy in World War II, New York:
William Morrow and Co., 1967.
U.S. Army, Field Manual 34-55: Imagery Intelligence,
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1985.
U.S. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War:
An Interim Report to Congress, Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1991.
Walker, Air Vice Marshal John R., Air Superiority Operations
,
Elmsford, NY: Pergamon-Brassey ' s International Defense
Publishers, 1989.




Receiving Office No. Copies
1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, VA 22304-6145
2. Library, Code 52 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5002
3. Director, Naval Intelligence 1
OP-92, The Pentagon, Room 5C600
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington, D.C. 20350
4. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-607) 1
The Pentagon, Room 4D563
Washington, D.C. 20350
Attn: LCDR Hurley, USN
5. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-50) 1
The Pentagon, Room 4E384
Washington, D.C. 20350
Attn: COL Habermacher, USMC
6. Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps 1
Director of Intelligence (INT)
Washington, D.C, 20380-0001
7. Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps 1
Plans Division (PL9)
Washington, D.C. 20380-0001
Attn: COL Vercauteren, USMC
8. LTGEN W.E. Boomer 1
Commanding General
Marine Corps Combat Development Center
Quantico, VA 22134
9. MAGTF Warfighting Center 1
Concepts and Plans Branch (C&P)
Marine Corps Combat Development Center
Quantico, VA 22134
Attn: LTCOL T.A. Reavis, USMC
130
10. Commanding General, FMFLANT
Attn: AC/S G-2
Norfolk, VA 23511
11. Commanding General, FMFPAC
Attn: AC/S G-2




I Marine Expeditionary Force
Attn: AC/S G-2
Camp Pendleton, CA 92055
13 Commanding General
II Marine Expeditionary Force
Attn: AC/S G-2
Camp Lejeune, NC 2 8542
14. Commanding General
III Marine Expeditionary Force
Attn: AC/S G-2
FPO San Francisco, CA 96602
15. Dr. Thomas C. Bruneau
Chairman, National Security Affairs (NS/Bn
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943
16. Center for Naval Warfare Studies
Naval War College
Newport, RI 02940
Attn: Dr. Donald C. Daniel
17. CDR R. Mitchell Brown III, USN (NS/Br)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943
18. Dr. Donald Abenheim (NS/Ah)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943
19. Prof. R. Norm Channel 1 (NS/Ch)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943
20. CAPT Phillip C. Chudoba, USMC












c.l Blinding the eyes of
the Corps.

